


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

THE SECURITY OF INDIA'S HIMALAYAN FRONTIER

The following staff study on "The Security of India's Himalayan Frontier" was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in response to a request from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. It is being circulated for the information of offices dealing with South Asian affairs.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

Geography. The Himalayan mountain chain, which constitutes the boundary between the Indian subcontinent and Tibet, is a significant but by no means impenetrable barrier. Despite rough terrain, difficult transportation problems, and cold or rainy climates, thousands of traders and pilgrims have until recently regularly crossed the considerable number of passes between India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet each year. Even many of those passes which tend to be blocked by winter snows for periods from a few days to seven months can be crossed by persons determined to do so.

Terrain in the Himalayas favors an invader from the north. The approach from the high plateau of Tibet is usually over relatively flat barren plains, and the final ascent to the border passes is relatively short. In contrast, the approach from the plains of India to the mountain crests is generally up through steep, heavily wooded mountain valleys 50 to 150 miles long. In the eastern portion of the Himalayas, where altitudes are lower, the problem of snow in the mountain passes is relatively minor, but heavy monsoon rainfall on the southern slopes between June and September creates rushing mountain torrents and landslides which seriously hamper movement. The northern invader has the advantage of choosing his point of entry. The Indian defender is at a disadvantage, since he cannot readily move forces in an east-west direction because of steep-sided river valleys and sharp ridges which run roughly north and south at right angles to the general east-west direction of the mountain ranges themselves. NEFA and Assam are particularly vulnerable, having direct land connection with the rest of India only by means of a narrow corridor crossing between East Pakistan and Bhutan. Through this corridor runs only one single-track railway line.

The people. The peoples who inhabit the Himalayas are the backwash of many civilizations, remnants of populations driven into refuge areas by succeeding waves of invaders and conquerors. Living in mountain valleys, usually isolated by streams and ridges from neighbors to the east and the west, they form heterogeneous groups of several racial backgrounds, many different languages, a wide variety of religions ranging from simple animism to complex Hindu and Buddhist philosophies, and cultures of which some are unique while others are related to those on the plains of India or the plateau of Tibet.

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There is little sense of national unity among the peoples in any part of India's Himalayan uplands, most groups caring little about others outside their own valleys, and leaders tend to be highly localized in their influence. In Nepal, which guards 500 miles of frontier against Tibet, the authority of the king carries little real weight beyond the edges of the Katmandu valley [redacted]

There are no outstanding animosities between groups of any significant size within the Himalayan hill regions, except in the Northeast Frontier Agency of Assam (NEFA), where highly localized, small-scale, intertribal feuding takes place. Possibly the strongest intraregional irritation is caused by Nepali emigrants who have settled in considerable numbers in southern Sikkim, the hill districts of West Bengal state, and in southern Bhutan and have taken over much of the economic leadership there. Between hillmen and the outside world, the main problem is a feeling of antipathy toward the people and government of India in the plains. Among hill residents in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh states, this feeling is one of being discriminated against by the Indian plainsmen. In Nepal there is dislike of being dominated by an outside power. In Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA, there is some resentment at interference from Indian outsiders seeking to "civilize" the local people who would prefer to be left alone.

Few in number, geographically scattered, culturally backward, and lightly armed, the population of the Himalayas in its present state of civilization would be unable either significantly to aid a military invasion from Tibet or to defend India against an aggressor.

Indian activity. The government of India thinks defensively in terms of securing the Himalayan frontier against attack from Tibet. [redacted]

while defending the Indian subcontinent during any future Chinese invasion. Most immediately, New Delhi would like to recover lost prestige by ousting Chinese forces from all territory lying within Indian-claimed boundaries. Unable to do this at present, the Indian government is concentrating on improving its political and economic position in the hills.

Having been awakened by the Chinese conquest of Tibet in 1951 to the possibility of a long-range threat from China, India began slowly and on a small-scale to strengthen its

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border defenses, especially in the eastern Himalayas. Following the Tibetan revolt in 1959, the Indian effort was greatly stepped up throughout the Himalayas from Ladakh to NEFA. Politically, one of New Delhi's major efforts has been to prove the historical claim that its administrative control actually extends all the way to the border. For military as well as economic reasons, India has attempted first of all to improve road and telecommunications networks leading into the high altitudes. Concurrently it is introducing economic development programs involving agricultural improvements, small industries, health and welfare measures and other projects designed to increase the loyalty of the local people by raising their standards of living. In the case of numerous groups who formerly made a large part of their living through trade with Tibet--now largely cut off--this economic activity is necessary to provide alternate means of livelihood. As a whole, development measures, begun in earnest only about 1960, have a long way to go to be effective and probably have not as yet reached a majority of the hill population. Regional factionalism within the Congress Party and Prime Minister Nehru's weakening grip on his government have hindered this program.

Propagandistically, India is attempting to create among the northern hillmen a sense of belonging to India and of antagonism toward potential Chinese aggressors. It beams some radio programs toward special groups such as the Ladakhis, but the actual content of the program is not known in detail. A press and pamphlet campaign is also under way, but its effectiveness may be limited among the hill peoples who have very low literacy rates. The Dalai Lama, now in Dharamsala in Punjab state, is a useful symbol around which to rally Tibetan hopes and activities.


Militarily, India has the psychological disadvantage of a series of defeats beginning in 1958 with the capture of its first patrol sent to eastern Ladakh and ending with the debacle in NEFA in 1962. Literally as well as figuratively, India is fighting an uphill battle, with the Chinese having the advantage. India's efforts to build up its military strength are hampered by a paucity of production capacity for heavy military equipment, by the difficulty of shifting the complex Five Year Plan organizational machinery into war-oriented patterns, and by the newness of its experience and research on operations at high altitudes. Western arms aid has eased the military problem on an immediate basis and raised Indian morale. Equipping, training and hardening of

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the considerably increased armed forces will require time, however. The Indian army is not yet effective in the mountains, as many Indian servicemen from the tropical plains require considerable acclimatization to high altitudes. Militarily, the Himalayan uplands now are only lightly held by Indian forces, and Indian commanders do not wish to try to retake claimed Indian border areas as long as the Indian army remains relatively weak.

Indian political security measures in the Himalayan regions date back many years, and an "Inner Line" beyond which non-residents cannot pass without government permission exists along the whole length of the mountains except below Nepal. India has taken strenuous measures to minimize possible Chinese influence in the hill regions, closing a Chinese trade mission at Kalimpong, shutting down the operations of the Bank of China in India, banning Chinese publications, arresting and deporting two thousand Chinese and maintaining a close watch on others. The Indian government is also building up Home Guard units, the National Cadet Corps, and other civil defense organizations, especially in northern regions. The government also maintains surveillance over Indian Communist Party activities, and it arrested many pro-Peiping Communists last fall. Politically, the Communist Party represents no serious threat to the Indian government, especially as the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions grows sharper.



Chinese activity. Chinese Communist policy apparently does not envisage the acquisition of significant new territory in the Himalayan borderlands in the near future. Peiping now holds the areas it considers to have strategic value. While it has said publicly it would fight to retain these areas--especially the Aksai Chin road--it would prefer that India

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not force it to do so. China does not insist that NEFA is of strategic importance to it, and in fact has indicated a willingness to trade its claims in NEFA for Indian recognition of China's control of the Aksai Chin. China maintains its willingness to negotiate a border settlement with India which would formalize this situation. Peiping apparently considers both Sikkim and Bhutan to be entities separate from India. It is working to move both states out of the sphere of Indian influence and into a position of "neutrality." Since 1959, China has said it would recognize only India's "proper" relations with these two states and that it would not discuss their boundaries with Indian officials.

In accordance with this policy, China's activities in the border regions--except in Ladakh and NEFA--have been confined mainly to the Tibetan side of the frontier where they have subdued most of the Tibetans politically and organized them economically. The Chinese have built a network of roads in southern Tibet. They have developed good east-west communications routes, with feeder roads running south toward the Himalayan border.

Chinese international propaganda actively attempts to convince the peoples of Asia and the world of Chinese reasonableness and Indian intransigence. Inside Tibet, the Chinese effort seems to be to convince the border Tibetans that China is a stronger power than India and that the Tibetans will do well to cast their lot with China. Except for the brutality they practised during the Tibetan revolt in 1959, the Chinese apparently have treated the Tibetans firmly but have attempted to win them over. The Tibetan radio broadcasts programs both in Tibetan and in Mandarin, but no radio propaganda is known to be beamed at any specific ethnic group along the border.

Since the punitive attacks in NEFA and Ladakh in 1962, Chinese troops have not probed actively along the Himalayan border, presumably to strengthen China's claim of peaceful intentions. Their military construction activities in Tibet seem mostly to be of a defensive character. China has warned, however, that if India attempts to reestablish checkposts along or on the Chinese side of the "line of actual control" they will be wiped out.

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Conclusion. Much of the Tibetan-Indian frontier to a depth of 50 to 150 miles into Indian territory now appears to be a partial vacuum--politically, economically, and militarily. India, with a firm intent to make its territory defensible up to the high mountain crests, is a late-comer in the field of border development activity and has not yet made good its aims. Communist China apparently has no immediate desire to seize military control of the southern Himalayan slopes.

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LADAKH

Summary. The high, barren mountains and plains of Ladakh support a minimal population which ekes out a meagre existence from marginal agriculture, pastoralism, and trade. As the Chinese Communists have demonstrated, military movement in the virtually uninhabited plains of eastern Ladakh may easily go undetected, and defense against aggression is therefore difficult. There is little evidence that the Indian armed forces based in Ladakh have significantly improved their overall military posture since their encounter with Chinese troops last fall, and India's hold over that part of Ladakh remaining in its hands is probably still a tenuous one. India's position is not subject to challenge by the passive Ladakhi population, but it is vulnerable to further Chinese attack. Chinese troops could probably take and hold the rest of Ladakh east of Leh should they so desire. Chinese capture of Leh would seriously weaken India's defensive position in Ladakh.

Geographical factors. Ladakh consists of high, barren terrain, largely inaccessible, lightly populated, and apparently lacking in exploitable resources. The disputed area of eastern Ladakh is an extension of the Tibetan plateau, characterized by a number of nearly uninhabited, flat plains at altitudes of 16,000 to 18,000 feet and separated from each other by ridges and mountains with peaks rising to 21,000 feet. Annual precipitation in the area is light--from 3 to 6 inches--and snow is not much of a problem. The Karakoram pass leading to Sinkiang is seldom blocked. Low temperatures and high winds in winter limit military action. Movement in eastern Ladakh, much of which is occupied by the Chinese, is relatively easy, and the Chinese have built a network of motorable roads leading westward from their main Tibetan routes primarily into the Aksai Chin region. Though of little military use to India, the barren plateau occupied by the Chinese is of strategic value to China because of the road through it connecting Sinkiang with southern and eastern Tibet.

The western part of Ladakh, occupied by India, consists of more rugged, difficult country dissected and compartmentalized by streams and rivers and crossed from northwest to southeast by the Great Himalaya and Zaskar mountain ranges. Access to this region from India proper is limited, and the main road from Srinagar, Kashmir, to Leh twists tortuously through rugged mountain valleys. Road maintenance is difficult and expensive, and movement is restricted in some

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sections to one-way traffic. Furthermore, the passes in the southern Himalayas west and south of Leh receive more precipitation than in the north and are frequently blocked by snow from November to June of each year. Although Indian supply lines into Ladakh are shorter, the Indian logistic position there is more difficult than the Chinese, and many Indian military posts have to be supplied by pack animal or airdrop.

The people. The Indian census of 1961 enumerated 88,651 persons in that part of Ladakh held by India, an area of about 37,000 square miles. About three fourths of the population is located in the districts of Leh and Kargil, while a quarter of the population is spread thinly in the valleys and plains elsewhere. There is virtually no population in the Aksai Chin area held by the Chinese. About 6,000 persons live in and near the town of Leh (elevation 11,500 feet) and about 4,000 at Kargil. The effect of the Sino-Indian conflict on the location and concentration of the Ladakhi population is unknown. Only 83 persons per thousand were literate in 1961.

Racially, linguistically, religiously, and culturally, the people of Ladakh are related to the Tibetans. They not only are a completely separate entity from the Indians of the plains, but they differ even from the other inhabitants of Kashmir who live in the Vale and in the Pakistani-held portions of the state. The majority of Ladakhis are Mongoloid in racial type. They speak a Tibetan language unrelated to the Dardic Kashmiri of the Vale or the Pahari spoken on the southern Himalayan mountain slopes. Over half of them are Buddhists of the Tibetan variety, in whose religion deities appear in human form and in which there is an emphasis on good and evil spirits. Religiously, the most respected sect in Ladakh appears to be that of the "Red Hat" Buddhists, the oldest Buddhist sect in Tibet and the one whose Ladakhi chief lama--at the Hemis monastery near Leh--is the most revered. Politically, the "Yellow Hat" sect is dominant. This sect, of which the Dalai Lama is the leader, is a reformist one with stricter behavioral rules for its adherents. The relative number of followers of each of these sects in Ladakh is not known, but they have not been reported to be in political conflict with each other. A minority of the Ladakhi population are Muslims, centered around Kargil. There are some Muslims and some Christians at Leh.

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The pattern of settlement in Ladakh is closely related to the type and elevation of the terrain. Valley lands below 12,000 feet usually are cultivated and support a small sedentary population. The higher valleys and high plains are utilized by herdsmen, and some barren valleys and plains are uninhabited. The agriculture practices in small plots in the narrow river valleys includes the growing of grain, some fruit, and saffron--a yellow flavoring highly prized in India for use in curries and cosmetics. Poplar and willow trees provide a minimum of wood for building and fuel. Ladakh as a whole is deficient in food supplies, some of which are imported from Kashmir proper. The area in general is a drain on the Indian economy. Originally, the wealth of Leh and Kargil was based on trade between India, Tibet, and Yarkand in Sinkiang. Trade with Yarkand dwindled after the Chinese takeover and has been cut off since about 1956. Trade with Tibet slumped to virtually nothing in 1960, but apparently continued at least sporadically till mid-1962 when a new summer-operated customs post was set up at Koyul (32-53N, 79-12E) on the road leading southeast from Chushul to Tashigong following the lapse of the Sino-Indian trade agreement of 1954. Leh and Kargil now are dependent on their own local resources, which consist chiefly of wool, semi-precious stones, and saffron.

Ladakhis apparently are not deeply interested in politics. While having no particular loyalty either to the former Maharajah of Kashmir or to the Indian government, the Ladakhis nevertheless have caused no trouble for India either at the time of partition in 1947 or since. They apparently are a passive group, who probably would prefer to be left alone but who are not prepared to oppose Indian administration.

Indian political and economic activity. Prior to 1959, India administered Ladakh rather lightly and political activity was kept in low key, though a Ladakhi branch of the ruling Kashmir National Conference party was established. The leader of this Ladakh branch, Kushak Bakula, a prominent "Yellow Hat" lama of Leh, sometimes clashed with the then premier of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, but since 1953 he has cooperated with the present premier, Ghulam Mohammed Bakshi.

The discovery of the new Chinese-built road in the Aksai Chin area in 1957 and the capture of an Indian investigating patrol in September 1958 considerably increased New Delhi's interest in Ladakh. About 1960, the Deputy Commissioner of Ladakh at Leh was reinforced by Additional Deputy Commissioners at Leh and Kargil, by Assistant Commissioners at

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Nubra and Chushul, and by subordinate officers at Leh, Kargil, Dras, and Zanskar. A superintending engineer was placed in charge of roads and public works under the Deputy Commissioner, who was also named as Development Commissioner. An effort was made to set up the Indian system of village panchayats (or self-governing village councils). Top men from the Indian Frontier Service were assigned to posts in Ladakh.

Ladakhi representation in the Kashmir state government was upgraded, and Indian Home Ministry officials also began to pay more attention to Ladakh. Ladakh for some time had been represented in the state legislative assembly by two representatives, Kushak Bakula, a Buddhist from Leh, and Aga Syed Ibrahim Shah, a Muslim from Kargil. Bakula, long the main political contact between the Ladakhi people and the government of India, was made Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs in the Kashmiri hierarchy. A Secretary for Ladakh Affairs was appointed to coordinate developmental activities in Ladakh. Kashmiri Premier Bakshi began to take personal interest in Ladakhi affairs, which he now reportedly controls completely. An additional Kashmir Secretary in the Indian Home Ministry lives in Srinagar, and both he and the Kashmir Secretary in New Delhi frequently visit Ladakh.

Kushak Bakula and the Muslim Ladakhi representative in the Kashmiri assembly belong to Premier Bakshi's National Conference, which completely controls Kashmiri politics. Bakula, Ladakh's chief spokesman, has been described as loyal to both Bakshi and Prime Minister Nehru, to whom he has ready access. Bakula appears to have no political rival in Ladakh and probably will be in office for a long time. No information is available as to election procedures in Ladakh.

Since 1960, Indian administrators have given economic development projects in Ladakh a relatively high priority. Roads are being built on a crash basis, and 700 Tibetan refugees were imported for roadwork in 1960. Leh has been electrified by means of diesel generators, and the possibility of developing hydroelectric power is being studied. A radio telephone circuit from Srinagar to Leh was installed in fiscal 1961/62. Irrigation works, seed farms, a veterinary hospital, stock improvement farms, and cooperatives are among Indian government activities. A weaving center

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has been started at Leh, and other small industries are being developed elsewhere. Hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity and child welfare centers are being established. As of 1960, there were 148 schools for boys and 13 for girls, with a total of 4,413 students attending. Additional schools are being planned. High school graduates attending college in Kashmir or in India are all given frontier scholarships. A college for the study of Buddhism has been established in Leh, apparently mainly to prevent scholars from wanting to visit Lhasa, where they might be indoctrinated with Communism. The Ladakh budget for 1960/61 called for development expenditures of over \$1,000,000 and the sum now has risen to over \$2,000,000. The government of India pays 90% of development costs in Ladakh, and all of the administrative costs.

The effect of the Indian military occupation in Ladakh has been slight. The Indian armed forces take virtually no supplies from the local population, which has none to spare. Service in military labor teams has provided a new source of cash income for the Ladakhis, but high prices in the local market have lessened this benefit.

Indian and Kashmiri press and propaganda activities in Ladakh are unreported in detail, and the general knowledge of the Ladakhi population regarding world events and the Sino-Indian conflict cannot readily be estimated. Radio Kashmir is known to broadcast a "Ladakhi Program" for 1.75 hours weekly, however.

Indian military [redacted] activity. The Indian army in Ladakh was relatively inactive up to 1958, when it began patrolling to determine the extent of the Aksai Chin road and other Chinese Communist activities. This was followed by the establishment of checkposts to maintain a watch on Chinese actions, and in 1962 new checkposts were pushed forward into areas claimed by the Chinese. The Indian army was surprised and severely jolted, however, by the combat capabilities displayed by the Chinese troops in late 1962, and its morale and prestige sank to a low ebb at that time. With a consistent record since 1958 of defeat or capture by the Chinese of Indian patrols and checkposts--except near Chushul--the Indian army in November 1962 was thinking defensively, not planning a determined defense until the Chinese closed in on Leh. Indian air force planes were used only for reconnaissance and resupply in the border areas during the fighting in 1962 and did not probe deeply into Tibet for fear of Chinese reaction. Since late 1962, the Indian 3rd Division and two Ladakh Scout battalions

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in Ladakh have been reinforced by another brigade and their training has probably been stepped up. Their morale has also probably improved as a result of Western military aid and the United States' agreement to provide road and airport improvement assistance.

Up to mid-1963, however, Indian forces respected China's self-imposed demilitarized zone and the desires of the Colombo powers and made little effort to keep in close touch with Chinese forces. In late June 1963, the 3rd Division was authorized to step up its patrolling in order to check on reports of increased Chinese military activity, but troops were told to move "cautiously." Only in early August was it reported that "vigorous" patrolling had been authorized. [REDACTED] Indian forces are not eager to press forward again into close contact with the Chinese, and they are probably ignorant of Chinese activities in large parts of Ladakh.

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Indian security measures in Ladakh include strict control over foreign visitors, who are not permitted to pass beyond Sonamarg on the Srinagar-Leh road without a formal authorization. The Indians permit a few newspapermen and foreign visitors to fly from Srinagar to Leh, but their visits are limited both in time and scope. Kushak Bakula said in the Kashmir assembly on 19 March 1963 that "adequate measures" had been taken to check Chinese Communist infiltration. Given the cautious attitude displayed by Indian military authorities [REDACTED]

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the prospect is that the Chinese--as in the past--could appear without warning in positions more advanced than they were believed to occupy.

Chinese Communist political and economic activity.
Politically, there is no evidence that Chinese military or civilian authorities make any special effort to govern the sparse population in those parts of Ladakh occupied by them. The seven supposedly "civilian" checkposts set up following the Chinese withdrawal in late 1962 apparently

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do not reflect the existence of any Chinese civilian administrative organization in Ladakh. The first noteworthy Chinese economic interest in Ladakh came to light with the discovery of the Aksai Chin road which had been completed in 1957. Subsequently, the building of other roads and the establishment of a line of military check-posts and fortifications in eastern Ladakh was revealed. There is no other known development activity conducted by the Chinese, however. Local people are not known to be employed by the Chinese army, which probably finds it easier to utilize its own manpower on construction projects.

In 1960, Tibetan lamas in Ladakh reportedly told residents near the Tibetan border that they would suffer the same fate as the Tibetans. This created some fears, but there was no general movement of Ladakhis away from the few border villages in southeast Ladakh. In 1962, the revival of Sino-Indian friction created some new panic in western Tibet, but the Chinese were said to be treating the Tibetans with relative restraint at this time, presumably in the hope of preventing their migration to Ladakh. Some Khamba refugees, however, entered Indian-held territory in southeastern Ladakh in the summer of 1962.

Chinese Communist military [redacted] activity. Chinese military activity in Ladakh began with patrolling in 1957 and 1958 in the area of the Aksai Chin road, the intent presumably being to protect this strategic communications link. In early 1960, following the capture of two Indian patrols, the Chinese limited their own patrolling to small scale reconnaissance. As India began to move troops and check posts into Chinese-claimed territory in eastern Ladakh, Chinese patrolling and military construction activity increased, and small clashes gradually grew into full scale war in late 1962. Following the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal, Chinese activity decreased. Between April and June 1963, however, Chinese military patrols again became active along their 1960 claim line. These small forces encountered Ladakhi herdsmen near Spanggur, in some cases forcing the latter to withdraw and in others leaving them alone. Some effort was made to interrogate the herdsmen regarding Indian army strength, the number of vehicles in Chushul, and the types of aircraft using Chushul airfield. Chinese troops evidently attempted not to antagonize the Ladakhis. In July 1963 the government of India accused the Chinese army of reoccupying posts in the demilitarized zone.

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Local reaction to the situation. Partly because of tight Indian censorship, very little is known of the attitudes of the local Ladakhi population toward India and Communist China or toward the present confrontation between the two countries. As mentioned above, the passive Ladakhis apparently have maintained good relations with the state government of Kashmir as well as with the government of India. Their chief leaders appear loyal to India. Brutal Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 is said to have warned the Ladakhis of the consequences of Chinese rule. In February 1960, some 5,000 people in Leh reportedly held a meeting to protest Chinese refusal to return Stagaldan Raspa, 18-year-old "Red Hat" lama of Hemis monastery near Leh, who had been studying in Lhasa and who was detained by the Chinese. Other less prominent Ladakhis, of whom about 400 were in Lhasa in 1960, were allowed to return home. Indian authorities are not anxious to effect Raspa's return to Ladakh for fear he may have been brainwashed.

Two battalions of Ladakhis in the Ladakh Scouts performed well in encounters with the Chinese. Tibetans in Ladakh are said to be unhappy that they do not receive more military training. There is no evidence, however, that the Ladakhi population in general would or could, serve as an effective deterrent or defensive force against a Chinese drive on Leh.

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KASHMIR AND JAMMU

Summary. The security of the Indian frontier in Ladakh is further weakened by geographic, political, and military situations which exist in the rest of Indian-held Kashmir. The Indian army in Ladakh is logistically dependent on air transport and on a single tortuous road winding from the Indian plains through the Vale of Kashmir to Leh. Pakistan--in Indian eyes--poses a constant military threat in western Kashmir by virtue of its claim to possession of the whole state. The population of the Vale is generally believed to prefer independence or incorporation into Pakistan rather than integration with India, although there have been no recent samplings of opinion. New Delhi and the pro-Indian Kashmiri puppet government have therefore been forced to maintain large military and police contingents in Kashmir, far out of proportion to the Pakistani military threat. Pro-Communists are prominent in the Kashmir state government, Communists are leaders in local political parties, and some Communists probably have infiltrated strategic installations such as power stations and transportation centers. As long as army, militia units, police, and counter-intelligence units maintain their present control and surveillance capabilities, New Delhi probably needs fear no large-scale popular uprising. Under conditions of actual invasion from Pakistan or Tibet, however, the local Kashmiri population would probably be unreliable.

Geographical factors. That portion of Indian-held Kashmir lying west of Leh consists for the most part of very rugged mountain territory, including the Zaskar, Great Himalaya, Pir Panjal, and Siwalik ranges, which lie parallel to each other in a generally northwest-southeast direction and have individual peaks reaching altitudes of 20,000 to 27,000 feet. Lying between the Great Himalaya and Pir Panjal ranges is the Vale of Kashmir, a valley 85 miles long and 25 miles broad. This valley, the most heavily populated and desirable portion of the state, contains almost half of the state's population in about 3% of its total area, and it is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The Jammu region, which lies on the southern slopes of the Siwalik range and extends onto the Punjab plain, differs materially in character from the more mountainous parts of the state. The rugged mountain and valley area of Pakistani-held Kashmir has always maintained a separate identity and is most easily reached by routes lying in Pakistani territory.

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Strategically, India has very poor access to most of Kashmir and Ladakh, though Jammu is readily accessible. The sole motorable link between India proper and Ladakh is a 520-mile road which runs roughly northward from the railhead at Pathankot in Punjab State to Jammu, then via either the Banihal Pass or tunnel to Srinagar in the Vale of Kashmir, and thence eastward at altitudes of 10,000 to 11,000 feet to Leh. The only other potentially motorable route to Leh is a 240-mile caravan track running northward from Mandi, Kulu, and Manali in Himachal Pradesh and Punjab states to Leh via the Rohtang Pass (13,000 feet), the Bara Lacha Pass (16,000 feet), and the Taglang Pass (17,500 feet). This route is now motorable only to the vicinity of the Rohtang Pass, which is blocked by snow from November to June. A third caravan track from Pathankot via Chamba and the Umasi Pass (17,500 feet) intersects the road from Kargil to Leh at Khalatse, but it is very difficult and probably cannot be converted into a motorable route. Lateral routes paralleling the main mountain ranges in Kashmir are virtually non-existent.

By contrast, road communications between the Vale and Pakistani-held Kashmir and West Pakistan are considerably better, crossing the Pir Panjal and Siwalik mountains by means of relatively low passes from Baramulla to Muzaffarabad, from Poonch to Mirpur, and from Poonch to Riasi, Jammu, and Sialkot. These routes formed Kashmir's natural outlets for trade and travel prior to 1947. The relatively easy access from West Pakistan to the Vale is of constant concern to India and has led to a concentration of Indian troops on this part of the cease-fire line.

The people. The Census of India in 1961 enumerated almost 1,900,000 persons in the three districts of Anantnag, Srinagar, and Baramulla, which constitute the Vale of Kashmir, with the population about equally divided amongst the three districts. The population of Jammu, on the southern mountain slopes in Doda, Udhampur, Jammu, Kathua, and Poonch-Rajouri districts was nearly 1,600,000 in 1961, mainly centered on the towns of Jammu and Poonch. The mountainous region of Kashmir east of the Vale is virtually unpopulated except for a few isolated settlements along the above-mentioned caravan routes.

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Kashmir, during its history, has been ruled by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Muslim overlords from India and has been overrun by Huns, Tatars, and Afghans as well. Its population is therefore varied. Culturally, however, the population of any given area in Kashmir tends to be homogenous regardless of the languages they speak or the religion they profess.

The people of the Vale and the mountains of northwest Kashmir are related primarily to the peoples of southwest Asia. Racially, they are Caucasoid, and many Kashmiris are very fair in complexion. Linguistically, they are more varied, the inhabitants of the Vale speaking mainly Kashmiri, an Indo-Iranian language of the Dardic variety. Urdu is the official language here, and other languages are also spoken. (In Pakistani-held Kashmir to the west, the southernmost inhabitants speak the Afghan Pushtu; the people of Hunza, somewhat farther north, speak Burushaski, a language with no known relatives; and in Baltistan, southeast of Hunza, the language is also southwest Asian in character.) The majority of people in the Vale and in northwestern Kashmir are Muslims, the Vale itself being about 75% Muslim. Literacy runs from 8% to 15% in the districts of this area.

Economically, the people of the Vale are agriculturalists, raising rice, wheat, corn, vegetables, and fruits. Higher up the mountain slopes are found herdsmen who raise cattle, horse, sheep, and goats. Long famous as artisans in weaving, woodcarving, and papier-mache work, Kashmiris may be found throughout India. Trade in timber constitutes about 40% of the annual revenue of the whole state and has its main outlets through Pakistan.

On the southern mountain slopes in Jammu, the population is more Indianized. Still Caucasoid in racial type, the population consists in large part of the descendants of Dogra Rajputs displaced from what is now the state of Rajasthan. They speak a variety of mountain dialects called Pahari, derived from the same Sanskritic roots as Hindi and Punjabi but not mutually intelligible. The Pahari languages of these hill slopes from Kashmir to central Nepal are more closely related to each other than to the languages of the plains. Religiously, about half the people of Jammu are Hindus, the rest being Muslims and Sikhs. The Hindus participate in the caste and other social observances of the plains but tend to have their own local varieties. Most of the people are settled agriculturalists, those in the plains growing primarily wheat, barley, millet and legumes. Literacy is slightly higher than in the Vale, running from 8% to 19% in various districts.

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None of the people of the Vale or of Jammu have any significant relationships, except in trade, with the Mongoloid Tibetan-speakers of Ladakh. Politically, the difference between the Muslims of the Vale and the Hindus of Jammu is important, the strongest opposition to Premier Bakshi's ruling National Conference party being found in Jammu and Poonch.

Indian political and economic activity. Following the partition of India in 1947, the then Maharajah of Kashmir state, a Hindu, elected to remain independent rather than to join either India or Pakistan. A Muslim revolution in the western part of Kashmir, in which irregular troops from Pakistan joined, led him to accede to India and to call upon the Indian army for assistance. With the entry of Pakistani regular army forces into the conflict, warfare developed between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The fighting formally ended with a cease-fire on 1 January 1949, arranged under the auspices of the United Nations. Since then, Pakistan has held the western and northern third of the state and India the central and eastern two thirds, including the Vale. India, however, claims the whole state and to date has flatly refused any settlement which does not permit it to retain at least that portion of the state it now holds.

Since 1947, Indian-held Kashmir has been ruled as a police-state under a puppet government tightly controlled by New Delhi. The nominal head of state is the son of the former Maharajah. Under him is a 36-man Council of Ministers with a Premier at its head. The legislative body is the popularly elected 75-man Kashmir State Assembly, which holds an additional 25 seats open for members from Pakistani-held Kashmir who--hopefully--may join the Assembly at some future date.

Kashmir's first Premier, Sheikh Abdullah, has been in jail since 1953, having displayed too open an inclination for independence. The present Premier, Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi, owes his position to New Delhi and would be powerless without Indian support. Bakshi is widely believed to have built a sizable personal economic empire.

He is disliked for this reason among others. Bakshi nevertheless rules with a firm hand, and, presumably because of his financial and political interests strongly opposes any

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Kashmir settlement which would alienate Indian-held territory. The population under his control is submissive, mainly for fear of military and police repression, though many profit through association with Bakshi [REDACTED]

Elections to the State Assembly are routinely [REDACTED] in favor of the pro-Indian Kashmir National Conference, which has dominated the political scene in Kashmir since 1947. All but five of the 75 members of the Assembly belong to this party. Opposition parties are largely ineffective

[REDACTED] They include the left-wing dissident Democratic National Conference, which broke away from the National Conference in 1957 and then rejoined it in 1960-- except for a small Communist-dominated faction which still calls itself the Democratic National Conference. The Praja Parishad, which is affiliated with the Bharatiya Jan Sangh party in India, is the mouthpiece of extremist Kashmiri Hindus. It is for total integration with India and holds two seats in the State Assembly. Its strength is mainly in Jammu. The Political Conference, which advocates union with Pakistan, is largely suppressed, as is the Plebiscite Front, comprised of Sheikh Abdullah's followers who favor a free plebiscite and self-determination.

Recognizing the basic antipathy of much of the Kashmiri population and the danger of subversion or outright invasion from Pakistan, India has from the beginning strenuously attempted to secure the loyalty of the Kashmiris through economic development measures as well as military domination. Traditionally, Kashmir is one of the poorest areas of the Indian subcontinent, most of its people being unemployed in winter and having only a short summer employment during the crop and tourist season. Except for timber, Kashmir's resources are mainly untapped. India's effort to improve the situation has included special attempts through land reform, irrigation, and new agricultural techniques to increase food production in the Vale. New Delhi has introduced a standard program of community development similar to that found throughout India. It has assisted in establishing new small industries, including drugs, joining, tanning, bricks and tiles, paper and pulp, and plywood, and has expanded the traditional output of forest produce, woolen textiles, and silk goods. It has set up three industrial estates to accommodate small industries and opened industrial training institutes in Srinagar and Jammu. Power has been augmented by expanding power stations at Ganderbal (outside Srinagar) and Mohora and by borrowing power from neighboring Punjab

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state. An increasing number of villages are being electrified. Eight-channel telephone carrier systems have been established between Jullundur, Jammu, Udhampur, and Srinagar, and telephone exchanges were opened at five new locations in 1961 and 1962. Radiotelephone service between Delhi and Srinagar was opened in 1961 and has probably been extended to Leh by this time. Education up to college level was declared free as of 1953, and the number of students at all levels has risen rapidly since then. Twenty-five colleges within the state were affiliated with the University of Kashmir in 1960/61. The first Kashmiri medical college was founded in 1959 and the first engineering college in 1960. Heavy emphasis has been placed by Indians on roadbuilding as a means of alleviating unemployment, and many Kashmiris are also employed in labor and transport activities in support of Indian troops near the cease-fire line.

Indian military and intelligence activities. Indian military and police activities in Kashmir have tended to offset any goodwill won by India through economic development measures. Since 1947, mainly to prevent further intrusions from Pakistan but partly to keep the local Muslim Kashmiri population submissive, India has maintained about three infantry divisions in Kashmir. These have been concentrated along the cease-fire line, at Srinagar, and in Jammu. In addition to these, Jammu and Kashmir Militia units have been raised, and both Indian and Kashmiri armed police have been organized. In 1963, some Punjab State Armed Police and Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary units were moved into the cease-fire line area to replace regular Indian army troops sent from the cease-fire line to Ladakh. In addition to these, various intelligence and counter-subversion elements of both Indian and Kashmiri government subordination operate in Kashmir. Indian army training--and presumably that of other security organizations--has been made considerably more rugged since the Chinese incursions took place in late 1962. Close surveillance of foreigners--a standard procedure up to about 1960--has probably been reimposed throughout Kashmir since 1962.

Chinese political, economic, and military activity. There is no evidence of direct Chinese Communist interest or activity in the Vale or in Jammu. The Chinese, however, have antagonized New Delhi by taking an anti-Indian position in regard to the western and northern part of Kashmir held by Pakistan. Peiping argues that it had a right to negotiate a border agreement here with Rawalpindi because Peiping has never accepted Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, that in any

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case the negotiations did not involve the question of ownership of Kashmir, and that after the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is settled boundary negotiations with China will be reopened. Some possibility of Chinese infiltration into Kashmir would exist if, as suggested following the signing of the Sino-Pakistani border agreement, routes are opened again from the Sinkiang border down into Pakistani-held Kashmir.

Soviet bloc interest in Kashmir. Soviet bloc countries, unlike the Chinese, have displayed some interest in Kashmir, probably for intelligence rather than subversive purposes. The benefit, if any, gained by China from such activities is doubtful, especially in view of the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. Security-minded India may have permitted this Soviet bloc interest because of the USSR's support for India against Pakistan on the Kashmir question. In 1956 both Czech and Hungarian technicians visited Kashmir to study industrial possibilities, and the Hungarians obtained a contract to supply equipment to two hydraulic power stations. One of these, at Ganderbal outside Srinagar, lies at the foot of the sole motorable road leading to Kargil and Leh, along which all Indian military movements to Ladakh are made. A Soviet trade official placed orders for Kashmiri handicrafts in 1957, and Rumanians and Czechs offered to build cement plants in that same year. The Indian parliament was told in November 1957 that the Czechs would help set up a cosmic ray research station at Gulmarg. In 1958 a Soviet economic delegation visiting Kashmir suggested establishment of a drug industry there. A reported Soviet attempt to establish a TASS office in Kashmir apparently aborted. In 1959 Czechoslovakia signed a contract to build a brick factory near Srinagar. In 1961 a team of Soviet experts surveyed Kashmir's forest resources and studied the possibility of setting up a pulp and paper plant. In 1963 East Germany expressed interest in setting up fruit canning, printing machinery, coal processing, and cement plants in Kashmir. These plants, though innocuous in themselves, would provide Bloc technicians with opportunities to observe Indian military installations and movements and might provide local Communists with the means of infiltrating work forces at strategic installations.

Kashmiri Communists. There is a Communist movement within Kashmir. The benefit, if any, gained by Communist China from this movement, however, is unknown. Superficially, the movement appears politically weak, subversively not active, and incapable of major sabotage because of Indian security

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measures. At the same time, it would appear to be in a position to exert considerable influence should it so desire. Four leftists or pro-Communists, Ghulam Sadiq, D.P. Dhar, Girdhari Lal Dogra, and Mir Qasim, have for years held key posts in the Kashmiri cabinet.

Other outright Communists have participated actively in party politics, mainly under the aegis of the opposition Democratic National Conference but also from within the ruling National Conference party. On various occasions, and most recently in late 1962, the Communist Party of India has considered establishing an overt branch of the party in Kashmir, but nothing much has come of this. A small core of party followers continues to operate in undisclosed ways inside Kashmir under the guidance of Harkishen Singh Surjit of the Punjab state party organization. A splinter group of the Democratic National Conference is apparently fairly openly identified with Communist aims. A branch of the all but defunct All-India Kisan Sabha, a peasant organization, is also under Communist control in Kashmir.

Communist Party policy in Kashmir is not readily evident. Some elements of the party, mainly in the Vale, have been reported as pro-Chinese. Others in Jammu are pro-Indian, and in early 1963 were [redacted] actively disseminating pro-Soviet literature. The influence of left-wing cabinet members on Premier Bakshi is unknown, and the relationship of Kashmiri leftists to Nehru and the Indian government is unclear. Bakshi supposedly suppresses Communists but does not hesitate to bring pro-Communists into his cabinet and is close to Krishna Menon. Why the security-minded government of India tolerates the presence of fellow-travellers in the Kashmiri cabinet has been an enigma for years, though the answer may be that they can be counted upon to be anti-Pakistan in outlook.

Local reaction to the situation. Because of Indian security measures and the American "hands-off" policy regarding internal conditions in Kashmir [redacted]

[redacted] regarding domestic Kashmiri attitudes toward India, Pakistan, the USSR or Communist China. Generalities widely accepted are (1) that the inhabitants of Pakistani-held Kashmir are loyal to Pakistan, (2) that the Muslim majority population in the Vale probably would prefer independence under Sheikh Abdullah but would vote for union with Pakistan if given the chance to do so, and (3) that the population of Jammu would vote to accede to India. Certain individuals such as Premier Bakshi owe

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their positions and wealth to Indian support and are therefore opposed to any change in the status quo. Others who have benefited from Indian economic development measures may question whether Pakistan would do as much for them. On the other hand, there is little indication that the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in Kashmir by India since 1947 have perceptibly increased the loyalty of the local population. In February 1961, an individual publicly supporting with both funds and propaganda the cause of imprisoned former premier Sheikh Abdullah was expelled from Kashmir. In the spring of 1963 the American Embassy in New Delhi received a "demand" purportedly signed by 41 religious "divines" in Kashmir for the release of Sheikh Abdullah, and the British High Commission received a communication supposedly signed by 125 residents of the Vale asking for a "neutralized" Kashmir. On 15 June 1963 there was an explosion in Premier Bakshi's official residence, which followed shortly after the burning of Kushak Bakula's house in Srinagar. Though these incidents suggest that disaffection continues in Kashmir, it is generally agreed that military and police forces there are sufficiently large to prevent any open revolt by the long-oppressed and presently submissive population as a whole. Kashmiris of the Vale reportedly were thrown into a state of panic upon learning of Chinese military successes in eastern Ladakh in 1962. Whether they would rise in support of a Pakistani invasion cannot be indicated with certainty. The main threat to Indian border security at present would appear to be from Communist attempts to sabotage communications and supply systems leading to the Vale and to Ladakh in the event of serious hostilities with China.

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PUNJAB, HIMACHAL PRADESH, UTTAR PRADESH

Summary. The Indian frontier districts which lie between Kashmir and Nepal, comprising parts of Punjab state, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, form a mountainous band about 120 miles wide, oriented in a northwest-south-east direction on the southern slopes of the Himalayas. This region, of all those along the borders of India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA, is probably the least favorable to large-scale military invasion by the Chinese and possibly the best secured on the Indian side. Peiping, which has made major territorial claims in Ladakh and NEFA, has only minor disagreement with India over this particular portion of the border. This area is also far removed from the main Chinese logistic bases in Sinkiang, West China, and Lhasa. Minor patrol clashes have occurred in the neighborhood of Bara Hoti, in Uttar Pradesh, where the Chinese claim possession of the pass at the crest of the mountains, but no major military activity has taken place in this region. Politically, the people on the Indian side of the border have in the past strongly supported the ruling Congress Party, and many of them belong to the martial classes which form the backbone of the Indian army. Nevertheless, both the Chinese and the Indian Communists have been spreading some propaganda among them.

To counter such activity, the Indian government has strengthened its administration of the border area and is speeding economic development projects.

Geographic factors. The area discussed here includes the following districts of three states:

Punjab state - Simla, Kangra, and Lahul and Spiti districts.

Himachal Pradesh - Chamba, Mandi, Bilaspur, Mahasu, Sirmur, and Kinnaur districts.

Uttar Pradesh - Dehra Dun, Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal, Tehri-Garhwal, Pithoragarh, Chamoli, and Uttar Kashi districts.

Topographically this region rises from the Indo-Gangetic plain to a foothills belt characterized by interspersed cultivation and scrub jungle. The bulk of the area's population is located in this belt. At a somewhat higher altitude, the forest becomes denser and consists in large part of oak, pine, and cedar. The

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population is smaller here, and more limited in distribution to isolated mountain valleys with individual characteristics. At the highest altitudes are barren reaches with little vegetation and features similar to those in the high mountains of Kashmir, Ladakh, and Tibet. The Spiti and Lahul valleys in particular contain flora and fauna more like those of Tibet than of South Asia. Population here is sparse. The Himalayas in this region reach noteworthy heights, with peaks ranging from 19,000 to 25,000 feet and passes lying at 15,000 to 18,000 feet.

Climate varies according to altitude. The plains fringe to the south is hot and dry, except during the monsoon season between June and September, when up to 30 inches of rain are deposited near the foot of the hills. Precipitation in the middle altitude belt ranges between 40 and 150 inches, with Simla, in the Punjab, receiving about 60 inches annually and Dharamsala an annual average of 126 inches. Winter rains also occur at this altitude. The high Himalayas are cool throughout the year, and passes are periodically closed by snow in winter.

Several of the largest rivers of the Indian subcontinent rise in this region and eventually flow to the sea through West Pakistan. The Chenab rises in Spiti and Lahul district, the Ravi in Chamba district. The Beas rises near the Rohtang Pass in Kashmir, and traverses the Kulu valley in the Punjab and Mandi district in Himachal Pradesh. The Sutlej, rising in Tibet, enters Uttar Pradesh near the Shipki La (Shipki Pass). The Jumna, the only one of the rivers which flows eastward, rises in Tehri-Garhwal district.

Four major strategic routes affecting Indian border security run through this part of India, mainly following river valleys. These are (1) a backdoor route to Ladakh, via Kulu, Manali, and the Bara Lacha Pass (described above), (2) a route up the Sutlej river valley from Simla to Shipki La (Shipki Pass) and Gartok in Tibet, which is the chief traditional Indo-Tibetan trade route in this region, (3) several routes branching off from Joshimath in Uttar Pradesh and leading to Toling in Tibet, mainly via the Mana La but also via the pilgrimage town of Badrinath and Bara Hoti, and (4) a route from Naini Tal and Almora along the western Nepal border via Lipulek Pass to Taklakhar (Taklakot) and the famous Mt. Kailas-Lake Manasarowar pilgrimage area in Tibet. All these are trade routes, motorable up to the middle-altitude belt in the mountains. Though the Chinese have developed relatively good east-west as well as north-south road networks fairly close to the border, there is

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very little east-west communication on the Indian side north of the Indo-Gangetic plain. In India, however, railway spurs run northward from the main Bareilly-Amritsar line to several points, including Pathankot, Simla, Dehra Dun, Rishikesh, and the vicinity of Naini Tal, and make India's logistic position somewhat easier than China's. This contrasts with the situation existing in Ladakh, Nepal, and NEFA.

The people. The total population of the hill districts under discussion was 5,653,000 in 1961, with 1,196,000 persons living in the hills of the Punjab, 1,351,000 in Himachal Pradesh, and 3,106,000 in the mountains of Uttar Pradesh. The bulk of the population inhabits the lower-lying foothills, where the population of each district ranges between 400,000 and 600,000. The high mountain district of Lahul and Spiti contains only 20,000 persons, Kinnaur only 41,000, and Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and Pithoragarh between 100,000 and 200,000 each. Population densities in the high altitude districts range from 4 per square mile in Lahul and Spiti to 16 in Kinnaur and 95 in Pithoragarh. This contrasts with 200 to 400 per square mile in districts close to the plains.

The population of this area is divided into three separate groups depending on the altitude of habitation. There is no outstanding animosity among them.

The inhabitants of the high Himalayas above 8,000 feet are mainly pastoral nomads of Mongoloid racial stock, speaking a Tibetan language, adhering to Buddhist faith, and being related in most aspects of material culture to the people of Tibet. The inhabitants of Spiti are "Yellow Hat" Buddhists like the Dalai Lama. The population of Kinnaur district consists mostly of a single tribal group, the Kannauras, of whom those living at high altitudes are Buddhists and those at lower altitudes Hindus. Some Bhotia traders in the northern parts of Tehri-Garhwal, Garhwal, and Almora districts also are Hindus. These Bhotias move up and down the mountain valleys with the seasons of the year, crossing the high passes to trade with Tibet in summer and descending to homes in India during the winter. There is no caste structure here, and polyandry--a Tibetan custom--is practiced. In the slightly lower valleys such as Spiti, there is some agriculture as well as pastoralism--barley, buckwheat, and peas being the main crops. Food in all these high altitudes is scarce. Literacy is low, ranging from 11% to 17%.

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The population in the isolated valleys and refuge areas of the heavily forested middle altitudes between 2,000 and 8,000 feet is basically South Asian rather than Tibetan. Racially, the people are Caucasoid. Linguistically, they speak a variety of languages, generally classified as Pahari (or mountain tongues), of types found along the whole southern slope of the Himalayas from Kashmir to central Nepal. These languages, of South Asian derivation, are similar to Rajasthani, Hindi, and Punjabi, but are closer to each other than to the languages of the plains and are mutually unintelligible. A group of pastoral tribes in the lower hills of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh states, known as Gujars and Gaddis, speak Gujarati, a tongue also related to Rajasthani. The religion of this mountain belt is Hinduism, but of a looser and less orthodox form than is found on the plains. It contains elements of earlier religions, including spirit worship and animal sacrifice. The caste system is also loose. Among the higher castes are the Rajputs, descendants of warriors from what is now Rajasthan state, who migrated or were driven into the hills and who include in their number many of the former princes and landowners of this region. Members of the Jat peasant caste and the Gujar pastoral groups rank lower in the hierarchy. There is more agriculture in the middle reaches of the mountains than at high altitudes, and forest products are among the main sources of revenue. Fruit is a major industry in Kulu valley in Kangra district. There are tea gardens in Kangra, Mandi, Sirmur, and Simla districts which produce good quality tea. Terraced rice fields are common to this mountain belt, and wheat, barley, and pulses are also grown. There is some trade with both Ladakh and Tibet. Literacy ranges as high as 27% in some districts.

The population of the plains and foothills below 2,000 feet is more cosmopolitan and more closely identified with the classic Hindu peasantry of the Indo-Gangetic plain. Leading languages are Punjabi, Hindi, and Urdu. Much of the population is identified with the Rajput landowning caste or the Jat agricultural caste. The Jats dominate Punjab politics. Former Rajput princes are important in the politics of Himachal Pradesh. Wheat, barley, gram, and maize are common food staples in this plains-and-foothills region, and irrigation is common. Indo-Tibetan trade passing through this area used to consist of borax, salt, and wool from Tibet and foodgrains, sugar, cotton textiles, and metal products from India. Most of this trade now is cut off. Literacy is higher here than in the mountains proper, running as high as 43%, well over the all-India average, in Simla district in Punjab state.

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Indian political and economic activity. Politically Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh states are controlled by the Congress Party, though the party organization in all three states suffers from factionalism. In the 1957 general elections, the Punjab Congress organization did better than anticipated, but it lost some seats in 1962. In the 1962 elections, the Himachal Pradesh Congress Party improved its position materially. In both the 1957 and 1962 elections the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, which previously had held an overwhelming majority, lost a considerable number of seats because of intense factionalism amongst its leaders. In both elections, however, the hill districts in all three states strongly supported the Congress Party, probably because it was the only one to have developed an organization reaching to the small town level.

Bickering and factionalism are taking a toll of Congress strength, however, and gradually weakening the basic loyalty of the people to the ruling party. Additional confusion is also caused by various religious, linguistic, and caste groups in the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh which are attempting to redraw the boundaries of these states to favor their respective groups. The former untouchables and depressed classes in the hill districts of Punjab state, who previously were loyal to the Congress Party, have been [REDACTED] drifting toward the Communist and other opposition parties.

Economically, the Congress Party in the Punjab has one of the best records in India in the field of economic development activity. In Himachal Pradesh it has also made considerable headway. Its record in Uttar Pradesh is possibly the worst in India. In all three states, however, a special effort seems to have been made since 1959 to speed road-building and other development projects to help secure the frontier districts against Chinese influence.

In 1960, the state governments considerably increased their efforts to tighten administrative efficiency along the frontier. The new district of Lahul and Spiti was created out of the old Kangra district in Punjab state. Its new district headquarters town now has a post office, radio-telegraph office, police station, hospital, and high school. In Himachal Pradesh, the new border district of Kinnaur was also created in 1960. In Uttar Pradesh in the same year three new border districts of Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and Pithoragarh were formed and placed under a single administrative division, of which the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh state is ex-officio Divisional Commissioner.

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The national and state governments have set aside over \$66 million to be used in special border development projects in the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh during the Third Five Year Plan period, of which the Indian government will pay 75%. \$58.8 million dollars, by far the largest share, will be spent in Uttar Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh will receive \$4.4 million and Punjab state \$2.8 million. The chief minister of each of the states has been made personally responsible for the success of the program. A Border Roads Organization has been set up to speed road construction. A major project, now primarily under Indian army control, is improvement of the Sutlej valley road leading from Simla to Shipki La. Citizens advice bureaus have been established to give directions to citizens as to what to do in emergencies and to coordinate the work of voluntary agencies in the interests of national defense. In June 1963, a separate organization within the Home Ministry in New Delhi was created to speed implementation of all border development activities in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh states and in Ladakh.

In Punjab state, the state university decided in 1963 to start classes in the Tibetan and Chinese languages. The town of Kulu plans a defense rally during the Dusserah festival in October this year. In Himachal Pradesh, youth are being sent to work camps near the border to learn how to do roadbuilding. The state Public Works Minister in Uttar Pradesh announced on 23 June 1963 that 36 miles of existing roads would be reconstructed and 68 miles of new roads built. Extensive construction on the Badrinath-Kedarnath pilgrimage road was reported in 1963 and persons were discouraged from taking this route. Communications are also being improved. Seasonal telegraph offices were opened at Kaza in Spiti valley and at Uttar Kashi and Kedarnath in 1961. New telephone offices were opened in Kulu, Joshimath, and Pithoragarh about the same time. Stricter controls on trade and smuggling have been in effect at all border points since 1962.

Indian military and intelligence activities. The Shipki La and Bara Hoti areas of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have been the scene of Sino-Indian military confrontations and small-scale patrol clashes since the early 1950's but there has never been serious fighting here, even in 1962 when the Chinese penetrated into Ladakh and NEFA. Sino-Indian conferences in 1958 resulted in agreement that unarmed Indian civilian administrators could collect taxes each summer in the Bara Hoti region and that Tibetan officials could collect revenue from Tibetan traders in the same

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location. Subsequent Sino-Indian talks, however, have failed to lead to a final settlement and demarcation of the border.

The most important recent step taken by India to improve military security in the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh-Uttar Pradesh border region was the establishment in June 1963 of a new army Central Command, with headquarters at Lucknow. This new command assumed responsibility for the defense of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa states, which formerly were under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Command. Troops under this new command consist of the 6th Mountain Division, with headquarters at Bareilly, one brigade at Ranikhet, another at Rishikesh, and a third brigade at Tanakpur. These forces represent a three-fold increase in troop strength in this area. In the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh area, which is under the jurisdiction of the army Western Command, there is one brigade at Kasauli, 3 more battalions at various locations, the 4th Mountain Division reconstituting at Ambala after being mauled in NEFA in 1962, and an armored brigade in reserve at Patiala. In addition, the 7th Mountain Division is raising at Dharamsala. Troops at present are not located directly on the border but are stationed several miles below the mountain crests on the Indian side. Police posts established close to the border watch enemy movements and presumably will give early warning of any impending Chinese advance into Indian territory. Eight companies of scouts being raised from local border people familiar with their own areas are to be used to harass enemy invaders and weaken their logistic capabilities. The main elements of the Indian army do not at present intend to offer a determined defense within about 50 miles of the border. No detailed information is available regarding civilian defense organizations such as Home Guards and National Cadet Corps units being raised in this region and the paramilitary capabilities of the population therefore cannot be judged. It is unlikely that existing forces could materially slow any Chinese drive across the border into India's hill districts.

Chinese political and economic activity. As indicated above, the Chinese have never made such extensive territorial claims in the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh-Uttar Pradesh area as they have in Ladakh and NEFA, having limited themselves mainly to small claims near Bara Hoti (called Wu-je by the Chinese). These claims, originally made in 1954, were the first officially advanced by Peiping against India. Despite a succession of Sino-Indian talks and temporary arrangements, however, the Chinese have maintained their

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claim that this is a "disputed area." In 1962, after the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal in Ladakh and NEFA, the Chinese specifically mentioned Bara Hoti as being one of four remaining areas of dispute. In April 1963 [redacted]

[redacted] alarmed the Indian government by considerably expanding the area in dispute at Bara Hoti from about 60 square miles to 200 or 300 square miles, possibly paving the way for more extensive intrusions than the Indians had previously believed likely.

Chinese political and propaganda campaigns in this region have apparently been conducted mainly--but not exclusively--on the Chinese side of the border. They have been aimed at enlisting the support of the Tibetan border people for Chinese programs and at creating the impression that India has "aggressive" designs on Tibet. [redacted]

Other propaganda was that the Chinese would return to India in August.

Chinese economic activities in recent years have included a steady buildup of road and communications networks and improvement of supply positions. In 1963, Chinese troops [redacted] were building a road leading toward Shipki La, toward which the Indian army was also pushing a motorable road on a high priority basis. A scarcity of food supplies on both sides of the border in 1963 led the Chinese to exhort Tibetans to deliver as much produce as they could and, by implication, to smuggle food across the border from India if possible. Nepali traders at Taklakhar complained in mid-1963 that their cattle were being taken away from them, presumably to ease the food shortage. [redacted] the Chinese closed Taklakhar and other customary markets to Indian traders in the summer of 1963. Possibly unreliable Indian press reports in mid-1963 stated that Pakistani goods were appearing in Gartok and Taklakhar as substitutes for Indian ones.

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Chinese military, [REDACTED] and subversive activities. There has been no military clash on this part of the Tibetan border for some years, though prior to 1958 Chinese patrols crossed the border at Shipki La and Bara Hoti with some regularity. Specifically, the Chinese did not attempt to occupy Bara Hoti when they attacked in Ladakh and NEFA last October. The Chinese army apparently is holding this sector fairly lightly compared to other areas, despite [REDACTED] [REDACTED] a steady buildup and the rounding up of local yak transport during the summer of 1963.

[REDACTED] the Chinese cannot readily maintain more than a division in this sector and that any Chinese thrust would be in somewhat smaller strength down from Taklakhar via Lipulek pass along the western boundary of Nepal. Chinese logistic difficulties probably would prevent any major push into Indian territory here, and any intrusion would be unlikely to reach beyond the foothills.



Indian Communist and Soviet bloc activity. In addition to the Chinese threat from across the Tibetan border, the Indian government faces a potential threat which might or might not materialize, depending on various circumstances, from Indian Communist and Soviet bloc activity in Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh hill districts.

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The tightly organized and well-led Communist Party in the Punjab has an influence beyond the number of seats it holds in legislative bodies. Its main strength lies among the Sikh peasantry and landless laborers and industrial workers in the western and central parts of the state. It is not strong among the hill Hindus, but is represented in Kangra district where it polled 36,500 votes in the parliamentary elections of 1962. It commands a smaller number of votes in Chamba and Mandi districts in Himachal Pradesh, but increased its voting strength here from 2,000 in 1957 to 5,000 in 1962 and won its first seat in the Himachal Pradesh territorial council from Mandi district in 1962. About 20,000 Communist votes were polled in the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh in 1962, most of them in the Dehra Dun and Naini Tal areas at the foot of the routes leading to Tibet.

The significance of the Communist presence in Kangra district is that it lies athwart the main backdoor route from the Punjab to Ladakh, where Communists can observe any Indian military movements or development activities. The route also provides the Communists with a communications link to Ladakh which could provide the Chinese with intelligence information. Dharamsala, the present headquarters of the Dalai Lama, lies in Kangra district, and the new Indian 7th Mountain Division is raising there. Jawalamukhi, site of recent Soviet-Rumanian oil-drilling activity and a major focal point for north Indian Hindu pilgrims, is also located in Kangra district. Communists in Chamba district in Himachal Pradesh are close to the Punjab railhead at Pathankot and the foot of the only Indian military supply route to Kashmir and Ladakh. In Mandi district, also a small Communist center, there is a large hydroelectric project at Jogindernagar. Since December 1962, most left-faction Punjabi Communist leaders who might be sympathetic to China have been in jail, and the assistance they might at present render to the Chinese is probably slight.

In Himachal Pradesh, the Communist Party organization, though small, has concentrated on infiltrating the Public Works Department Labor Union and the Government Transport Workers Union, which control virtually all organized labor in the territory and whose members are engaged in vital road-building and transportation activities along routes leading to Tibet. Communist opportunities for intelligence collection, communications with border areas, and sabotage are obvious. The party is also trying to rally peasants in the state and has made some headway with the former untouchable classes. Party members also spread pro-Chinese Communist propaganda when possible.

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In Uttar Pradesh in recent years the Communist Party has exploited discontent in the backward hill tracts and has increased its organizing activities in the Himalayan upland districts along the border. It has also been active amongst former untouchables and has gained some ground with them. Working quietly in the villages, mainly stressing economic problems, the Communists have avoided flashy campaigns. They have not publicly sided with China but have sought to create doubt and confusion on the China question. That they are working hard on transport and roadbuilding labor groups is suggested by the fact that one prominent Communist in Almora district in mid-1962 [REDACTED] was deputy chairman of the Kumaon Transport Workers Union, divisional secretary of the Public Works Department Employees Union, and president of the Almora Municipal Employees Union.

Possibly of some interest in connection with local Communist activities in the border region is the fact that the most recent Soviet bloc development projects seem to be located closer to the border than earlier ones. As stated above, Soviet-Rumanian oil-drilling teams worked at Jawalamukhi as early as 1958. In 1960 a team of Russians was erecting a spinning mill at Dehra Dun, the site of an Indian military academy at the foot of one of the routes leading into the hills. Between 1961 and 1963, India signed a series of contracts with the USSR for construction of a heavy electrical project near Hardwar, in Uttar Pradesh, where for the first time a number of Soviet instructors were to be located in India to train up to 800 Indians annually in technical matters. Previously, Indian students had gone to the USSR for training. Hardwar is a famous north Indian pilgrimage site where many thousands of persons congregate each spring. The USSR is also building an antibiotics factory at Rishikesh, near Hardwar. Both Hardwar and Rishikesh are on the railroad spur at the base of the road leading to Joshimath, Badrinath, and the Bara Hoti frontier region, a route much used by Indian pilgrims heading toward the border. On 3 July 1963, the USSR signed a contract to supply equipment for the right bank power plant at Bhakra Dam in Punjab state, one of the largest hydroelectric power projects in India and the source of power for much of north India. The United States is aiding construction of a power plant on the left bank.

Local reaction to the situation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the attitudes of the hill people themselves toward the Sino-Indian dispute and toward the efforts of both sides to influence them. As stated

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above, at the time of the general elections in February 1962 the hill peoples apparently remained preponderantly loyal to India and to the ruling Congress Party, whose representatives they returned to parliament and state assemblies in large majorities. The Communists did make some gains in the elections, however [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] landless laborers and former untouchables were becoming increasingly disgruntled over their poor lot. Since then, factionalism and the activity of special interest groups probably have weakened the loyalty of the populace to the Congress Party though not necessarily to India.

The extent to which attitudes have changed since the Chinese attacks in October, is not known. Many villages in the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and western Uttar Pradesh, a major recruiting ground for the Indian army, lost sons in the fighting in Ladakh and NEFA and their inhabitants presumably are not well-disposed toward China. Extensive Indian economic development activities in the border regions presumably are bringing new employment opportunities and new amenities to the hill people. [REDACTED] this is lessening the feeling of the hill dwellers that they are neglected and discriminated against [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There remains the danger that infighting among prominent Congress Party leaders, especially in Naini Tal and Almora districts, may result in programs being carried out less effectively than advertised. The fact that opposition parties [REDACTED] are making gains here suggests that this is so. Probably the main cause for concern is the concentration of Communist strength in roadbuilding and transportation labor unions which could be exploited for the purpose of intelligence or sabotage if desired.

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Summary: The Himalayan frontier between Nepal and Tibet poses special security problems for India, since New Delhi at present can neither control Nepali defense policy nor directly defend the Nepali frontier with its own troops. Prime Minister Nehru has publicly stated that India regards Nepal's frontiers as its own for defense purposes and that it would defend Nepal against aggression. Nepal, however, being landlocked between India and Tibet, is concerned with both Indian and Chinese Communist views, and India has not succeeded in influencing either the Nepali government or the Nepali people to declare themselves openly against the Chinese. The government of Nepal, especially since 1955, has made a strenuous effort to remain neutral both in world affairs and in regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, to increase its ties with as many nations as possible, and to free its political and economic institutions from Indian control or influence.

The Nepali army, despite some years of training by Indian military instructors, can do no more than maintain internal security. It would be ineffective against Chinese invasion, except in localized counteractions. In the event of a Chinese attack, Indian troops would therefore have the alternatives of entering Nepal unasked, of waiting until Nepal requested assistance, or of remaining on the Gangetic plain and waiting for Chinese forces to debouch from the hills. One way or another, Indian troops would probably be found inside Nepal in the case of a Chinese attack. At present, however, it appears unlikely that Peiping plans military aggression against Nepal. Should the Chinese use economic penetration, subversion, or other non-military measures to undermine the government of Nepal, India would find it difficult to intervene effectively.

Geographical factors. Nepal is 500 miles long and 140 miles wide and covers an area of about 54,000 square miles. The northern border of Nepal coincides in most areas with the crests of the Great Himalaya range, although in some places the highest peaks lie south of the border. Like the hill districts of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, Nepal is divided geographically into three major east-west belts according to altitude.

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Closest to the Tibetan border is a high altitude zone of rugged mountains and sparse population, with mountain crests ranging between 20,000 and 25,000 feet and individual peaks rising to 28,000 and 29,000 feet. The terrain here is extremely rugged and relatively barren, being marked by steep slopes, narrow valleys, torrential streams, cold climate, strong winds and perpetual snow above 18,000 feet. The economy of the few inhabitants is mainly pastoral, there being little agriculture, but some people depend on trade for much of their living.

To the south of this is a broader, middle-altitude belt rimmed by mountains on both the north and south, but with a number of large valleys in between supporting about half of Nepal's total population. The Katmandu valley of 200 square miles area is the largest and by far the most important of these valleys. It contains three of the country's six major towns--Katmandu, Patan (or Lalitpur) and Bhadgaon (or Bhaktapur). The climate in this belt, which lies between 2,000 and 10,000 foot altitudes, is milder. There is moderate rainfall, with clouds and storms being especially prevalent during the monsoon season from June to September. The population, which ranges as high as 2,000 per square mile in density in the Katmandu valley, is oriented toward agriculture, terraced rice fields being a prominent part of the landscape. Wheat and maize are also grown. This belt is also wooded, in uncultivated portions, with heavy forest at elevations between 12,000 and 14,000 feet.

Along the southern boundary of Nepal adjacent to India is a narrow plains and foothills region called the Terai. The eastern and more heavily watered portion of this area contains about 30% of Nepal's total population and the three other major towns in the country--Bhairawa, Birganj, and Biratnagar. The Terai, which rises from the Ganges river floodplain to an altitude of about 2,000 feet, shares the same hot summer, mild winter, and June to September monsoon season as the plains of India. The forest which covers much of this region is moist, dense, and full of animals and endemic disease. Movement across or through it is complicated by these factors as well as by flooding streams. Rice, wheat, sugarcane, and jute are primary crops.

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Although the main Himalayan ranges in Nepal run in an east-west direction, lateral communication is difficult because of the north-south orientation of numerous high mountain spurs and most of the major river valleys. Administration, trade, and defense are made difficult because of this terrain problem. Rapid east-west movement at present is possible only by air along a network of small landing fields available mostly to light planes and in some cases to DC-3s. An east-west national highway, surveyed initially by the USSR, is now under construction in spots under the direction of the Nepali government, primarily with local volunteer labor. The main transportation routes in Nepal run in a north-south direction. Only a single major Y-shaped route crosses Nepal between Tibet and India. One fork of the route from Tibet enters Nepal below Girang Dzong and the other below Nyalam Dzong and both converge at Katmandu. Below Katmandu there is a single, motorable, 140-mile road leading south to a railhead in Nepali territory at Amlekhganj and thence to Raxaul in India. This route is now being made motorable from Katmandu to the Tibetan border at Kodari (below Nyalam Dzong). There are only about 100 additional miles of motorable roads in all of Nepal, mainly in the southern plains and in the Katmandu valley.

There are a dozen or more important north-south non-motorable caravan routes leading from Tibet into Nepal and a variety of smaller trails which make invasion relatively easy and defense difficult because of the lack of lateral communications. Most tracks over 16,000 feet in altitude are blocked by snow in winter, but several important routes, including the ones to Girang Dzong and Nyalam Dzong, cross from Tibet via relatively low valleys that are unaffected by winter snows. Despite the difficulty of many of the passes and trails in Nepal, considerable annual movement of persons takes place along them. Till recently, some 30,000 or more Tibetans found their way to Calcutta to trade each winter, and a large number of Nepalis migrated to India for winter trading.

The people. The Nepali population of not quite 9,000,000 persons is both racially and culturally mixed, sharing about equally Caucasoid and Mongoloid racial traits and Hindu and Buddhist religious beliefs. The boundary between India and Tibetan peoples and cultures is not sharp here as in Kashmir and the north Indian states. The strongest Mongoloid racial traits and Buddhist cultural

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influence are in the high Himalayas where population densities run as low as 50 per square mile and small villages of 25 huts or thereabouts cluster on the mountainsides. Indian Hindu influence is strongest in the Terai. The central mountain belt is very mixed. Many groups live in isolated valleys having little contact with each other or with Katmandu, and the people have no special loyalties to any power lying outside their immediate neighborhood.

There are eleven major ethnic and caste groups in Nepal--Brahmans, Thakurs, Chetris, Gurungs, Magars, Newars, Murmis, Sunwars, Kirantis (including Rais and Limbus), Bhotias (including Sherpas), and Tharus. The Brahmans, Thakurs and Chetris are widely dispersed throughout Nepal. The Caucasoid Brahmans are descendants of Hindu political refugees who left India at the time of the Muslim conquest between the 12th and 16th centuries A.D. The Thakurs and Chetris are mainly Mongoloid, with some Caucasoid mixture. They are Hindu by religion and social customs but have equal-ranked exogamous clans rather than the caste system. They play a prominent part in Nepali affairs. The Thakurs are descendants of Rajputs from northwest India, driven eastward by Muslim invasions. They intermarried with Gurungs and Magars. The present royal family belongs to this group. The Chetris, of Rajput and Brahman stock, have the same sort of history. The Rana family, formerly hereditary prime ministers of Nepal, belong to this group.

The Magars, who are found throughout the whole central belt of Nepal, and the Gurungs of west central Nepal are of Tibetan origin. They are Mongoloid types, not very Hinduized, and have exogamous clans of equal rank instead of the caste system. They are among the groups generally called Gurkhas, and they supply a considerable number of men to the Nepalese, Indian, and British armies. The Newars of the Katmandu valley and adjacent areas probably came originally from Tibet, but they now are very mixed. About 50% of the Newars are either orthodox Hindus or Buddhists in approximately equal numbers, while the rest are of mixed Hindu-Buddhist faith with overtones of aboriginal shamanism and animism. The Newars, however, have an elaborate Hindu-type caste system, there being some Hindu castes, some Buddhist castes, some mixed castes, and some untouchables among them. They were conquered by Gurkhas from the west about 1769 A.D. The Bhotias of the northern

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border areas are essentially Buddhists of the Tibetan variety, culturally indistinguishable from Tibetans, with a mixed economy of agriculture and pastoralism, and much involved in trade.

The Murmis, Sunwars, and Kirantis of eastern Nepal are Mongoloid racially, not much Indianized, and rather isolated from the rest of the country. The Limbus, a subgroup of Kirantis, are related to the Lepchas of Sikkim and have migrated to southern Sikkim in considerable numbers in recent decades. They are close to the Bhotias culturally. The Tharu cultivators who live along the whole southern Terai and plains border next to India are an old, indigenous tribal group of Caucasoid extraction. They were apparently driven to the hills by later Caucasoid invaders.

There are about 20 mutually unintelligible languages in Nepal, plus additional dialects. The western Nepali tribes speak Pahari languages related to those in the lower Himalayas between Nepal and Kashmir. The dominant language is Nepali, one of two in Nepal with a written literary tradition. It is the language of the Thakurs and Chetris, who led the Gurkha conquest over the Newars of central Nepal. It is related to Kumaoni of Uttar Pradesh to the west and eventually to Rajasthani and Sanskrit. Newari, the other language with a literary tradition, is of Tibeto-Burman stock and is spoken by about 1,000,000 people in central Nepal. The Bhotia and eastern tribal languages are also Tibeto-Burman. The people of the Terai, mainly the Tharus, speak Hindi dialects common to the adjacent Indian plains areas. Literacy in Nepal is very low, estimated at only 5%, with most literates living in the Katmandu valley.

Nepal is self-sufficient in food at a subsistence level, and exports foodgrains to Tibet in return for salt and wool. Ethnic groups and their economies are closely correlated with altitude in Nepal, special groups of staple crops being grown at different altitudes. Up to about 6,000 feet, closely associated with Hindu, Indianized cultural groups, rice cultivation is common, frequently in terraced fields, with maize and millet grown as summer crops. Cattle and goats are common domestic animals. In the middle altitudes, as among the Gurungs and Magars at 6,000 to 8,000 feet, people depend on barley and wheat as winter crops and maize and millet as summer grains, with

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buckwheat a summer crop in the higher altitudes of this zone. A modified form of Tibetan culture is found among the Bhotias between 8,000 and 10,000 feet, with wheat and barley as winter crops and buckwheat a summer crop. Pure Tibetan culture is found above 10,000 feet, where only a single crop of wheat or barley is possible each year and yak and sheep replace cattle and goats as domesticated animals. There is very little formalized industry in Nepal, most crafts being of the home variety. Exploitation of forest products is one of the most important industries. There is some manufacturing around Katmandu and in eastern Nepal at Biratnagar, mainly jute products, cigarettes, matches, food products, and cotton textiles. Many industries depend on Indian capital, managerial talent, and markets. Nepali industry is not equipped to support any kind of war effort.

Trade is organized on a primitive basis, being conducted mainly by individual family members making annual trading trips to the plains of India. There is some trade with Tibet. Water power is available but undeveloped, and minerals are largely unexploited. Imports from India have been strictly controlled since 1960 and reexports of strategic items to Tibet supposedly are forbidden. Actually foodgrains and other items are freely traded or smuggled to Tibet.

Indian political and economic activity. The Indian government, concerned over the defensibility of its Himalayan frontier, suffers conflicting emotions regarding the amount of pressure it should attempt to exert on Nepal. Until recently, Nepal's landlocked position, its primitive political organization, and its dependence on India for trade outlets, foreign exchange, and communications with the outside world make it susceptible to Indian advice and direction. The Indian government, hoping to increase its influence in Nepal, tacitly concurred in the Nepali revolution of 1951 which overthrew the Rana family of hereditary prime ministers and temporarily established a constitutional monarchy system of government. India also permitted socialist political groups in India to provide supplies to the Nepali revolutionaries. In 1961 and 1962, after the king in 1960 had assumed full personal control over the government by means of an army coup.

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Since King Mahendra succeeded his father in 1955, however, Nepal has increasingly withdrawn from India's grasp. Mahendra has steadily increased the number of countries with which Nepal has diplomatic relations, the number being four in 1954 (United States, Great Britain, France, and India) and now nearly 50. Nepal recognized Communist China in 1955 and the USSR in 1956. Mahendra recently restricted the use of Indian currency, which once circulated as freely as Nepali money. He has taken steps to develop an independent Nepali postal service, thus curtailing India's control over international postal service which formerly had to pass through the Indian embassy in Katmandu.

Mahendra has also expanded trade and accepted economic aid from India, the United States, the USSR, and Communist China, as well as from the United Nations and a number of small European and Asian countries. During the last two years particularly, he has engaged in diplomatic and economic maneuvers with Pakistan designed to free Nepal's trade and communications from Indian control. A direct air route between Katmandu and East Pakistan has been established, and Nepalese trade in limited quantities can now pass in and out without Indian supervision. In economic, as in diplomatic, relations Mahendra has attempted to maintain a balance between the Soviet bloc and Communist China on the one hand and India and the Western world on the other.

Fear of Chinese power in Tibet has led Mahendra to tread softly in dealing with Communist authorities; he has been careful not to antagonize them but at the same time they have treated him "correctly." Trade relations with Tibet were formalized by agreement in 1956. A Nepal-China boundary agreement was negotiated in 1960 and signed in 1961. Nepal and Communist China have no immediate points of conflict between them.

India now is more or less powerless to prevent the above trends for fear that too much pressure will merely lead Nepal into the arms of Communist China. King Mahendra has played skillfully on this fear. Diplomatically India is attempting to keep the Nepalis sufficiently friendly to call in Indian troops if Nepali boundaries or internal security are threatened.

India has also invited King Mahendra to New Delhi and has made sure that the Indian ambassador in Katmandu is less overbearing than before. Economically, India provides

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Nepal with funds and technical assistance to counter economic assistance from Communist countries. India commenced economic assistance to Nepal in the early 1950's, gave Nepal the equivalent of \$21 million for its First Five Year Plan in 1956, and has assisted it with additional funds since. New Delhi is helping to construct hydroelectric projects, a road network, and is assisting in community development activities. The Indian domestic airline conducts regular service to Nepal. India and Nepal also exchange cultural visits and exhibitions. The All-India Radio broadcasts programs to Nepal in the Nepali language, probably without much effect on the Nepali people. The government of Nepal has excised Indian film material considered unfriendly to Communist China, but it does not permit blatant anti-Indian propaganda to be disseminated by the Chinese.

Indian military [redacted] activity. India has been particularly concerned over Nepal's military security since the Chinese completed their conquest in Tibet in 1951, and it has attempted without marked success to improve Nepal's military capabilities. Nepal, recognizing a potential threat from China, in 1952 admitted an Indian army training mission to reorganize the then 45,000-man Nepali army into a more effective fighting force only about 10,000 strong. India was also invited to improve Nepal's police system. By 1955, the Indian mission had cut the size of the army to 10,000 men and had reorganized it into three brigades and smaller support-type units. In 1963, a fourth brigade was being raised to increase the total size of the army to more than 11,000. As of this date, however, Indian training has not yet greatly improved Nepali army capabilities. The Nepali army still lacks good leadership, logistic support, and communications. It loses its best potential recruits to the Indians and the British, who between them have nearly 50,000 Gurkhas under arms. The main point in favor of the army probably is that it is the only organized military force in the country. It is loyal to King Mahendra, who depends on it to maintain himself in power. There is no evidence of Communist influence in the army.

The Nepali army is capable only of maintaining internal security. It would be virtually useless in stopping a Chinese Communist invasion because its combat troops are so scattered, so poorly supplied, and have such poor communications that their activities could not be coordinated.

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Nepali arms are old, consisting mainly of British weapons of pre-World War II vintage, and Nepal is completely dependent on outside sources for arms supplies. There is no air force to use the small airfields which are located mostly near the Indian border and are therefore not useful for distributing troops to meet a Chinese attack in the north. Nepali border checkposts, of which there are 19 along the Tibetan frontier, are manned only by small police units with Indian radio communicators attached.

Nepali sensitivity to Indian domination has prevented Indian troops from being permanently stationed in Nepal, and probably will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Nepal is not a party to any military pact and is unlikely to sign any. Nevertheless, Indian troops were permitted to enter Nepal in 1952 to help suppress a rebellion. They were again invited into the country to put down anti-government political demonstrations, and in 1953 they helped crush a bandit group in western Nepal. In 1963 Nepal has indicated some interest in Indian military aid. Indian police have occasionally entered southern Nepal to put down localized unrest. With the recent establishment of a new Indian Army Central Command, located in Lucknow, India may be able to improve its military capabilities on the Nepali frontier and eventually place an infantry division in position to oppose any Chinese attack through Nepal. At the moment, however, the Indian army is engaged in building up its forces in Ladakh and NEFA and cannot do much for the Nepali army. The Nepalis since late 1962 have had some doubts as to the effectiveness of the Indian army.

There are nearly 150,000 ex-soldiers (Gurkhas) from the Nepali, Indian and British armies now living in Nepal who could meet age and physical requirements for military service if necessary. Most belong to the Magar and Gurung tribes from west central Nepal and to the Kiranti group from eastern Nepal. These individuals and their fellow tribesmen might be available for military or paramilitary activities if desired. They would be a good source of trained manpower, though their effectiveness could be limited by weakness in leadership or by reluctance to do anything which might jeopardize the pensions received from the British and Indian governments. These pensions constitute an important source of Nepal's annual financial income. The Bhotias of northern Nepal, who are related to the Tibetans, are apparently anti-Chinese in outlook, but

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some are also critical of the Nepali government for discouraging entry into Nepal of Tibetan refugees. The Kiranti tribes of Eastern Nepal have long desired a separate state and are not motivated in favor of the government at Katmandu. Probably the most effective guerrilla group in Nepal is about 2,000 refugee Khamba tribesmen in the Mustang area of north central Nepal who range freely in Tibetan territory between Takhakhar and Tingri Dzong and harass Chinese lines of communication.

[REDACTED] They get along relatively well with Nepali checkpost personnel and are a source of concern to the Chinese, who try to blame India for their activities. An additional small group of Khambas, recruited by the Chinese Nationalist government, irresponsibly conducts depredations both in Nepal and Tibet and irritates the government of both countries as well as the Dalai Lama.

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Chinese political and economic activity. Up to 1951, Nepal's outside relations were mainly with India, except for a small trade conducted with Tibet. After 1951, however, China's position in Tibet became something the Nepalis had to consider. Nepal recognized Communist China in 1955, and during the next two years the prime ministers of the two countries exchanged visits. Visits at various levels still continue. In 1956, Nepal and China signed a treaty of friendship which ended Nepal's privileged position in Tibet by abolishing extra-territorial rights, limiting trade to certain specified points, and requiring passports and visas for travelers. At the same time, however, China granted Nepal the equivalent of \$12.6 million in economic aid. Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 alarmed the Nepalis, but in 1961 the two countries signed a border accord which delimited the frontier and created a 20-kilometer demilitarized zone. Nepal at this time accepted an additional \$21 million worth of Chinese economic assistance.

Chinese aid projects in Nepal include a paper mill, which at last report was making little progress in construction. A proposed leather factory has also dropped out of the news recently. A cement factory supposed to be built by Chinese is encountering problems, including apparent Indian reluctance to permit transit through India of Chinese machinery. The road being built from Katmandu to Kodari with Chinese assistance seems to be the only joint Sino-Nepali project making satisfactory progress at the moment. There are about 100 to 125 Chinese technicians in Nepal, working on these projects. The Chinese have also supplied some communications equipment and three small AN-2 aircraft to Nepal. Trade between Nepal and Tibet is conducted on both a formal and informal basis. Alternately, the Chinese seem to encourage and discourage trade. Most recently, they have cut Nepali profits by forcing traders to deal only with the Chinese state trading corporation. The Chinese in Tibet require foodgrains, gasoline, rubber tires, and iron, fair quantities of which seem to reach Tibet despite Indian and supposed Nepali restrictions. The total value of commodities traded between Nepal and Tibet is not great, however.

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The Chinese propaganda effort directed at Nepal is not a high pressure one, the Chinese apparently being satisfied with their basic relationships at present. Chinese films and exhibits are shown in Katmandu and some outlying towns, but there are no special cultural attractions drawing large crowds. The Chinese radio and press tend to fan latent anti-Indian sentiment by repeating anti-Indian comments taken from the Nepali press, but the government of Nepal has suppressed dissemination in Nepal of Chinese newspaper charges that India is aiding the Khamba refugees who raid Nepali and Tibetan villages. There is some Chinese propaganda aimed at getting Tibetan refugees to return to Tibet. Basically, Chinese diplomatic and propaganda efforts seem directed at maintaining friendly relations with Nepal while quietly encouraging the Nepalis to be critical of India.

Soviet Bloc political and economic activity. Soviet bloc diplomatic and economic activity in Nepal is conducted along lines similar to the Chinese but is unrelated to the Chinese effort. Nepal has trade, aid, and cultural agreements with the USSR. King Mahendra has visited the USSR, and other visitors are exchanged at various levels. There are some Nepalese students in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Three Soviet projects are under construction in Nepal--a sugar factory near Birganj being built with Soviet and Czech equipment and technicians, a cigarette factory at Janakpur, and a hydroelectric project at Panauti. A Soviet-built hospital in Katmandu is already completed. There are two Soviet MI-4 helicopters in Nepal. A Soviet economic adviser in Nepal's National Planning Council apparently has only limited effectiveness. About 67 Soviet technicians were in Nepal in the spring of 1963.

Soviet bloc trade with Nepal has recently included cement and corrugated iron sheets, export of which is restricted by India. Poland and Czechoslovakia have recently become new Nepali trading partners, having engaged in barter deals for jute with private Nepali traders.

Nepal Communist Party activity. The Communist Party of Nepal is an additional factor of doubtful weight which enters into the picture of Nepali and Indian border security. The party apparently has no capability to overthrow King Mahendra at present, but it may have a subversive potential in certain areas which could make it

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
dangerous both to Nepal and to India in the event of Chinese military action or serious subversive effort. Estimates of party membership range from 3,000 to 6,000, with the greatest concentration in Katmandu and surrounding towns and in eastern Nepal. Nepali Communist leaders are not outstanding and tend to take direction from Indian Communists. The party was banned in 1952 because of alleged complicity with an anti-government revolt. The ban was lifted in 1956 and the party began to press for more democratic government. It did poorly in the first Nepalese general elections in 1959, winning only 4 of 109 seats in the House of Representatives and polling only 7% of the votes. In Katmandu, however, it got 20% of the vote and in the eastern and central Terai 15%. It works among peasants, intellectuals and students. The party, long in contact with Indian Communists, began to get additional guidance with the establishment of a Soviet embassy in Katmandu in 1959 and a Chinese Communist embassy in 1960. It was banned again in 1961 along with other political parties after King Mahendra took over sole control of the government.

The Communist Party of Nepal is now split into two or three factions, one demanding the overthrow of King Mahendra, a second supporting the king and operating overtly with his tacit approval, and a third trying to prevent the other two from splitting the party into ineffective factions. The unity group seems to be developing close ties with the Indian Communist Party's more moderate centrist faction. The Sino-Soviet dispute has had little effect on the Communist Party of Nepal.

Chinese military [redacted] activity. The Chinese are estimated to have about 25,000 troops opposite Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, including at least elements of one infantry division, three independent infantry regiments, and two border defense regiments. These troops apparently are actively engaged in roadbuilding and in the construction of barracks, bunkers, supply dumps, and other defensive installations which are gradually strengthening the Chinese side of the frontier. Since signature of the Sino-Nepali border agreement, Chinese troops have not harassed Nepali personnel at border checkposts, engaged in overt border crossings, or maintained obvious military pressure on the Nepali frontier. This apparently is in line with Chinese

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political policy, which uses good relations with Nepal as a contrast to the poor relations supposedly created by Indian intransigence, military "aggressiveness", and general uncooperativeness. Chinese troops are capable of crossing the lightly held Nepali border at a number of points at any time, however, and of penetrating virtually to the Indian plains.



Local reaction to the situation. During the past decade Nepal, like many other underdeveloped Asian and African countries, has been concerned mainly with increasing its economic strength and its stature in world affairs. The efforts of Nepali leaders have necessarily been directed primarily at freeing Nepal from dependence on India. In this process, the Nepali government has taken actions irritating to the government of India. This has prompted Indian responses which in turn have irritated the Nepalis.

[REDACTED] They have also chafed at Indian trade restrictions, aimed at China, which have cut down exports of petroleum products, cement, and corrugated iron sheets to Nepal. Indian criticism of the Nepali agreement with China for construction of the Katmandu-Kodari road has also antagonized the Nepalis. Relations between New Delhi and Katmandu are therefore subject to periodic strain, with mutual suspicion of each other's actions occasionally becoming marked.

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CHUMBI VALLEY, SIKKIM, BHUTAN, AND WEST BENGAL

Summary. That portion of the Himalayas which includes the Chumbi valley of Tibet, the Indian protectorate of Sikkim, the kingdom of Bhutan, and the northeastern districts of India's West Bengal state poses special security problems for New Delhi. Through this region runs the easiest trade and invasion route from Lhasa to India. This route traverses the Chumbi valley, crosses two alternate passes into Sikkim, and then drops via the Tista river valley to the plains of West Bengal. The Tibetan border here is only about 40 crow-flight miles from the narrow corridor and single-track railway line which are the sole links between the rest of India and the state of Assam.

As in other parts of the Himalayas, the people of this region are diverse, the basic populations of Sikkim and Bhutan being mixed Tibetan and aboriginal stock, with Tibetan racial, linguistic, religious, and cultural characteristics dominant. To these have been added a more recent strain of immigrants from Nepal, who now live in the southern portions of both countries and who create political friction there. Most of these Nepalis are Hindus, who through their energy and initiative have taken over much of the economic wealth of the areas in which they live. People of Mongoloid racial stock spill over into the hill districts of West Bengal, but the inhabitants of the lower slopes and plains are primarily Caucasoid, Indo-European-speaking Hindus.

Indian political relations with the hill peoples in this region are complicated by the fact that Sikkim has its own "autonomous" internal administration and that Bhutan is essentially independent, except for a treaty agreement to be "guided" by India in conducting its foreign affairs. Though both Sikkim and Bhutan lie more or less at India's mercy--Indian troops are located in Sikkim--the government of India nevertheless has to deal circumspectly with both these states to avoid raising antagonisms strong enough to turn local attitudes in favor of China. Bhutan, at least, is vulnerable to Chinese attack. In addition, India is faced in this area with more intra-regional political friction--between aboriginal and Nepali elements--than exists elsewhere in the Himalayas. There is also some suspicion or antagonism in both Sikkim and Bhutan toward India. Communist influence till 1962 was strong in the Bengali districts of Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar, though recent Indian security measures presumably have lessened this threat somewhat.

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Chinese political and military interest in the Chumbi valley, Sikkim, and Bhutan is also considerable. China refuses to recognize India's special relationships with either Sikkim or Bhutan, insists on treating both states as separate national entities, and is attempting to lure them into a position of "neutrality" between India and China. Chinese maps have in the past indicated a claim to portions of eastern Bhutan, but this subject has not been pressed by Peiping. Peiping's propaganda also emphasizes frictions between India, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Chinese military actions along the Sikkimese border consist of construction work, frequent patrolling, and occasional overflights.

Since late 1961, tightened Indian censorship and security restrictions on visits by foreigners to border areas have virtually dried up overt and covert reporting on Sikkim, Bhutan, and the northern districts of West Bengal. Thus, the effect of Indian security measures following the Chinese attacks in October 1962 is unknown, and realistic assessments of the dangers of Chinese espionage, subversion, sabotage, and propaganda activities are precluded.

Geographical factors. Prior to recent hostilities, the main military, trade, and communications route between Tibet and India ran from Lhasa, past Gyantse, through the Chumbi valley to Yatung, thence over the Nathu La (14,137 feet) to Gangtok in Sikkim or over the alternate Jelep La (14,346 feet) to Kalimpong in West Bengal, from which point the combined routes descended the Tista river valley to the railhead of Siliguri on the Indo-Gangetic plain. Though trade and communications along this route now are virtually cut off, it still remains the shortest and easiest route along which a Chinese attack could be pressed to the Indian plains. The road from the Nathu La to Gangtok and Siliguri is motorable on the Indian side, and below Gangtok is mostly hard surfaced. The Jelep La route is motorable except for a portion between Kalimpong and the border. A narrow-gauge rail line extends to Darjeeling (7,200 feet). The single-track meter-gauge railway line at Siliguri is India's sole rail link with the state of Assam, and is vital to the defense of that state.

A lesser route runs from Phari Dzong, near Yatung in Tibet, by mule trail to Paro in Bhutan and thence by motorable road (completed early in 1962) south to the rail line in West Bengal about 60 miles east of Siliguri. An additional route runs by trail from Bum La and Towang or from

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Khinzemane in NEFA to Tashi Gang Dzong in eastern Bhutan and thence by motorable road to Darranga on the plains of Assam. There are other minor passes and routes between both Sikkim and Bhutan and Tibet.

The Chumbi valley prior to 1800 belonged to Tibet. It then passed to Sikkim as part of the dowry of a bride married into the Sikkimese royal family. Subsequently it came under British control. In 1908 it was given back to Tibet by the British and Chinese power was recognized as paramount in it. Today, the Chumbi valley is a 30-mile-long "dagger pointed at the plains of India." It runs north and south and extends downward between Sikkim and Bhutan to within about 40 air miles of the plains of India's West Bengal state. The Chumbi salient consists of the headwaters and upper tributaries of the Tonsa river, which cut deep, narrow valleys through steep-sided, wooded hills and mountains. Precipitation in the Chumbi valley varies from 15 inches a year at the north to 35 inches at Yatung in the south, though some of the higher exposed hills receive much more than this. At Yatung (9,500 feet) winter low temperatures average about 16 degrees Fahrenheit in January. In summer, average highs rise to the mid-sixties. Elevations in the valley range from 15,200 feet at the Tang La (pass), in the north to near 9,000 feet at the Bhutan border in the south.

Sikkim, the Indian protectorate, lies mainly west of the Chumbi valley and is separated from it by high mountain ridges. It is a sparsely populated state of 2,744 square miles area, 73 miles long from north to south and 55 miles wide. It is an all-but-enclosed basin, deeply dissected by the headwaters of the Tista river, which cuts through the mountains east of Darjeeling and spills onto the Indian plains. The highest point in Sikkim is Mt. Kinchinjunga (28,000 feet) and the lowest at the gap near the plains 750 feet. Rainfall of 120 to 180 inches annually, mostly in the June-September monsoon season, makes for heavy forestation and rapid erosion. Snow falls above 8,000 feet. Temperatures are moderate, ranging between about 40 and 86 degrees Fahrenheit except in the highest mountains. The highest portions of the hills near the snows are rarely visited. At relatively high elevations are coniferous forests, while in the hot, steamy river valleys at low altitudes are tropical forest trees including sal, a good lumber species. Copper, coal, graphite, gypsum and other mineral deposits are not exploited. Most human habitation is in the middle altitudes between 3,500 and 7,500 feet, Gangtok the capital and largest city being at 5,750 feet.

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Bhutan, which lies east of the Chumbi valley, is considerably more remote. It had no motorable roads before 1959, and its government permitted very few foreigners to enter it until about the same date. Several roads are now under construction, but much movement inside the country is still by pack trail. There are no airfields in Bhutan. The country is 190 miles long, 90 miles wide, and has an area of 18,000 square miles. Nearly all of Bhutan is mountainous, with peaks rising up to 24,000 feet in the north. Much of the country is forested. Narrow, north-south valleys at elevations between 5,000 and 9,000 feet are found in central Bhutan, and the major settled areas and administrative centers of the country are located in these valleys. Heavily forested hills and plains mark the southern border. Thimbu, Bhutan's official capital, is near Paro, the administrative center of the country, and lies at an elevation of 8,000 feet.

The West Bengal districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, which reach upward toward the Chumbi valley between Nepal, Bhutan, and Cooch Behar, and through which passes the access route between Assam state and the rest of India, lie at the south of the invasion route to India. They are located between the river basins of the Ganges and Brahmaputra. They are separated from Nepal by peaks up to 12,000 feet high and from Bhutan by mountains up to 23,000 feet. The Tista river, which drains this area, flows southeastward into the Brahmaputra. The hill towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong lie at altitudes of 7,200 and 4,200 feet respectively. The hills in this area are heavily wooded, mainly with forests of sal trees, as the south slopes are warm and moist. Monsoon rainfall here is heavy, ranging from 120 inches annually at Darjeeling to 200 at Buxa in Jalpaiguri district. Erosion is heavy and streams flood heavily as they reach the plains. The foothills of the Terai up to about 2,000 feet are covered with scrub jungle wherever the growth has not been cut away for agriculture. The alluvial plains are heavily populated and cultivated. In Cooch Behar there are jungles of high grass and reeds rather than trees, the area being lowlying, waterlogged plain, poorly drained and flooded in the rainy season. There is much bamboo and palm growth here. The temperature on the plains seldom reaches above 90 degrees Fahrenheit but the humidity is trying. Low temperatures are near 50 degrees. Movement is difficult in the Terai foothills of Jalpaiguri and the jungles of Cooch Behar.

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The people. The people of Sikkim, Bhutan, and northern West Bengal state are of varied types. In Sikkim, the Indian census of 1961 listed a population of 162,189 persons, 96% of whom were rural dwellers. Density of population was only 59 per square mile, 139 of Sikkim's 460 villages having less than 200 persons each, only 6 having over 1,000, and Gangtok--the capital and largest town--having only 6,848. Only 12.3% of the population was literate, a figure just half of that in India.

The original population of the state consisted of Lepchas, to which were later added Tibetans and Bhutanese and, still later, Nepalis. The Tibetans, now referred to as Bhotias, live in the northern regions. Together with the Lepchas, who inhabit central Sikkim, they consider themselves to be the true Sikkimese, although at present the combined Bhotia-Lepcha population is only one quarter of the total population. The royal family, which is related by marriage to noble families in Tibet and to the royal family of Bhutan, is of Lepcha stock. The language of the Lepchas is Tibeto-Burman, and Buddhism is the state religion. Because of intermarriage with Tibet, the royal family's affiliation is probably with the "Yellow Hat" sect of Tibetan Buddhists, while the majority of the Lepchas and Bhotias of Sikkim--like the people of Bhutan--adhere to the "Red Hat" sect.

About three fourths of the Sikkimese population are descended from Nepali immigrants who were encouraged by the British to settle in southern Sikkim and Bhutan in the late 19th century. These Nepalis multiplied rapidly, and quickly took over most economic institutions in the state. This is a subject of friction between the two ethnic groups, since the Lepchas control the government while the Nepalis dominate the opposition political parties. Most of these Nepalis apparently are Hindus, probably of the mixed varieties that exist in Nepal.

Politics in Sikkim are more formalized than they are in Ladakh, NEFA, and some other parts of the Himalayas. The chief of state is [REDACTED] Maharajah [REDACTED]. The guiding force of the government is the energetic Maharaj Kumar (crown prince), who is well educated, eager for economic progress, and sometimes too enthusiastic for the taste of Indian administrators. A State Council, now consisting of 6 elected Lepcha-Bhotia members, 6 elected Nepali members, 1 elected member at large, 1 representative from the Buddhist monasteries, and 6 members nominated by the palace, acts as a legislature. The first elections to it were held

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in 1953 and the next in 1958. There have been none since. The 6 nominated members give the Lepcha ruling family control over legislation. Since Sikkim is an Indian protectorate, India has until now appointed a dewan (executive officer) for the government and a Political Officer who gives guidance and advice to the Maharajah. On 1 September 1963 the post of dewan will be abolished in deference to Sikkimese sensitivities regarding Indian control. These Indian officials have owed their position to the fact that the Maharajah in 1949 called in Indian troops to suppress popular unrest and in 1950 signed a treaty retaining a measure of local autonomy but granting India control over defense, communications, and external affairs.

There are three important political parties in Sikkim. The Sikkim National Party consists of Lepchas and Bhotias, is patronized by the royal family, and supports the present communal electorate system. The Sikkim National Congress, a strong offshoot of the National Party, is dissatisfied with the communal electoral system and with Indian administration in Sikkim. The Sikkim State Congress, whose members are mainly of Nepali descent, favors full adult franchise and direct elections as a means of breaking the Lepcha hold over the government. All three parties favor greater public participation in the affairs of state, and they chafe at the slowness of the royal family in implementing reforms.

Other political issues which cause the government of India occasional concern include suggestions, in varying form, for the political unification of eastern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Darjeeling district in West Bengal. These suggestions are pressed by interested parties both inside and outside Sikkim, some of them Communist-inspired. There is no Communist Party in Sikkim. Intra-mural friction also exists between Lepchas and Nepalis on the subject of citizenship qualifications in Sikkim.

The economics of Sikkim are still relatively simple. The main concentrations of population are at the middle altitudes near the center of the state. Settlements are usually small hamlets, scattered widely, rather than compact villages. Agriculture is practised in small plots on terraces or on the very few patches of level ground to be found in Sikkim. Wet rice, cultivated in terraced fields is a major crop. Dry rice, buckwheat, maize, and millets are grown in a modified slash-and-burn manner, wherein a patch of jungle is cut down, crops planted for a few years, and

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the field abandoned for another as weeds and underbrush become too thick. Forests could be extensively exploited but are not. Fruits, including good oranges, apples, and potatoes are grown. Cardamon, a ginger-like herb, is the chief cash crop. Sikkim is virtually self sufficient in food. Prior to the Tibetan revolt in 1959 there was a brisk trade in foodgrains, kerosene, and manufactured goods with Tibet, supervised by the Indian diplomatic mission in Lhasa and by Indian trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung. Sikkim's chief imports are other foods and clothes. There is very little industry. Sikkim's annual revenue in 1961 was about \$1,000,000.

Economic development in Sikkim, whose first Seven Year Plan ended in 1961, has concentrated on the improvement of agriculture and road communications. A second plan, emphasizing industry and mineral exploitation, began in 1961/62.

In Bhutan, there has never been an official census, and the population is variously estimated as between 700,000 and 900,000. Some 60% of the population are Drukpas, physically, religiously, and culturally related to the Tibetans. They live in northern Bhutan. Central Bhutan contains a variety of aboriginal tribal groups including Khens, Kurteys, and Mempas. The Drukpas and the aborigines have become linguistically, religiously, and otherwise welded into a single group which thinks of itself as Bhutanese. The people of this group are Mongoloid racially; their speech is related to Tibetan. They intermarry into Tibetan families. Their religion is Buddhism of the Tibetan variety and their affiliations are with the "Red Hat" sect. The many Buddhist monks in Bhutanese monasteries are a serious drain on the simple economy. The population of southern Bhutan, on the south slopes of the Himalayas consists in large part of recent immigrants of Nepali stock, the same people encouraged by the British in the late 19th century to settle in southern Sikkim and Darjeeling district. These Nepali immigrants speak Nepali, are mainly Hindus, and follow Hindu caste customs. They were only given full Bhutanese citizenship in 1958.

Politically, Bhutan is now ruled by an energetic young king, whose capital is at Thimbu. The royal family is related by marriage to the leading families of Sikkim and Tibet. The king speaks Hindi and English as well as Bhutanese and maintains a lively interest in world affairs. His wife, the queen, was educated in England. The king's government used to be somewhat peripatetic, being wherever the king was at the moment, and it shifted from a summer capital at Paro to

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a winter capital at Punakha. This latter capital has now fallen into disuse. The Maharajah of Bhutan is assisted in governing by the Bhutanese National Assembly (or Tsongdu), an advisory body of 126 indirectly elected village elders. There are no political parties inside Bhutan, though the Bhutan state Congress party, which consists mainly of members of Nepali descent, agitates against the government from a headquarters at Siliguri in India's West Bengal state. This party conducted a statewide anti-government agitation in 1954 and was banned.

Bhutan's foreign relations which, according to a treaty of 1949, are "guided" by India, are conducted mainly by the Maharajah's personal representative--often informally called his prime minister--who resides in Gangtok, in Sikkim, a more accessible location than Thimbu.

Economically, the people of Bhutan are three quarters agricultural and one quarter pastoral, with a sprinkling of traders among both these groups. By and large the economy is self-sufficient, a fact which has enabled Bhutan to maintain its isolation until recently. Some stream valleys in Bhutan are wide enough for irrigated rice agriculture to be practised. Elsewhere on gentle slopes, dry-farmed maize and millets are staple crops. Forests produce lac, wax, and musk. Bhutanese oranges are good, and India has helped to establish an orange soft drink industry in Bhutan. There is a dairy farm in the Ha valley, and some other parts of the country also raise fine cattle. Large herds of yaks are grazed in high pastures.

There is little industry in Bhutan, though efforts now are being made to develop it. Before trade was cut off in 1959, Bhutan used to export rice and butter to Tibet in exchange for salt. In 1960 there were 72 government schools in Bhutan offering free education; 2,500 students (or about 30 per school) attended. Scholarships were given by the governments of both India and Bhutan to schools and colleges in India. Bhutanese schools teach Bhutanese, Hindi, and English. There are very few medical facilities in the country. There is no great wealth and no grinding poverty. The annual national income is about \$1,000,000. Culturally, the country is just emerging from a medieval phase in which archery has been the national sport. The process of modernizing the economy, which began in earnest in 1959, cost the king some popularity when he raised taxes materially and insisted they be paid in cash rather than kind.

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In the Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar districts of West Bengal, the people are of mixed stock, some of the mixture being of relatively recent date. In the hills at middle altitudes are people with Mongoloid strains, including some recent Nepali immigrants. Also found in the hills are pigmold aboriginal Santal tribesmen from Bihar state who have migrated to work on the extensive tea plantations in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts. In the plains are populations of mixed Caucasoid, Dravidian, and Mongoloid stock. Languages in the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri area are Tibeto-Burman; in the plains they are dialects of Bengali, an Indo-European tongue derived from Sanskrit. Religiously Hinduism dominates, as both the plains people and the Nepalis of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri are followers of this faith. There is much Buddhist admixture in Nepali Hinduism, however, and a lot of spirit worship in the Hinduism of the plains. Christian missionaries have made numerous converts in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri. In Cooch Behar, 60% of the population are Rajbansis and Kochs, who form a distinctive caste. The Rajbansis are believed to be of aboriginal Dravidian origin while the Kochs are of Mongoloid stock.

The economy in the hills near Darjeeling includes terraced rice agriculture, with maize and millets grown by dry farming. Tea is also widely cultivated in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, where it is an important source of income. Tobacco is grown in the foothills. In the plains, rice is the staple food crop and jute an important cash crop. Maize, pulses, sugarcane, and oilseeds are also grown. Rice is traded uphill to tea plantation labor forces, and jute and tobacco traded to markets in the south. The large immigrant labor population in the tea gardens of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri is frequently exploited for political purposes, mainly by Indian Communists. Nepalis are subject to nationalistic suggestions that a separate Nepali state be created from eastern Nepal and parts of Sikkim, Bhutan, and West Bengal.

Indian political and economic activity. India's effort to secure the Himalayan frontier area in the Sikkim-Bhutan region has been complicated by the fact that it has several different political systems with which to deal.

The fact that Sikkim is an Indian protectorate gives New Delhi an advantage since it can, in the last analysis, achieve its will through the combined efforts of the Political Officer and the Indian armed forces located within the state. India, however, has no desire to aggravate irritations already existing in this sensitive border area as a

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result of the Indian presence, and it has not applied great pressures to sway the Sikkimese government toward the Indian way of thinking. Rather, New Delhi has concentrated on economic development as a means of building goodwill. Since fiscal 1953/54 it has been the prime mover and sole financier behind Sikkim's Seven Year Plan (1953/54 - 1960/61) and subsequent development efforts. These efforts concentrated during the Seven Year Plan period on improving agriculture and road communications, on broadening educational and medical facilities, and on strengthening Sikkim's Tibetan culture. Specific measures included establishment of a community development organization, and development of forest industries construction of roads, minor irrigation projects, a fruit preservation factory, a veterinary hospital, a number of hydroelectric projects, and schools and hospitals. The total sum contributed by India for this plan was in the neighborhood of \$7,000,000. A second plan, for about \$27,000,000 in development expenditures, beginning in fiscal 1961/62, was to concentrate on industrial development and mineral exploitation, but little is known about it and its nature and size may have been radically altered since the NEFA-Ladakh crisis of 1962.

In Bhutan, India has no direct political control, and it has to walk softly to prevent creating antagonisms. In addition, the Indian army cannot now effectively defend Bhutan. The Bhutanese, traditionally suspicious of India, might until recently have attempted to counter any Indian political pressure by making overtures to the Chinese authorities in Tibet. With the Tibetan revolt of 1959, however, Bhutan re-oriented its foreign policy thinking in the direction of India, and both political and economic relations with India have been growing ever since. One of Bhutan's first actions in 1959 was to authorize the construction of a road network leading from India's West Bengal and Assam states northward into Bhutan and connecting eastern and western Bhutan. Simultaneously, Bhutan agreed to construction of a hydroelectric station at Jaldhaka, on the Bhutan-India border, to supply power to the West Bengal districts of Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar. Bhutan also permitted India to make cartographic surveys, both by land and from the air. In 1959 and 1960, Bhutan made an effort to expand its foreign relations to include political and economic contacts with Western and Soviet bloc countries, but India prevented this under its 1949 treaty right to "guide" the foreign relations of Bhutan. This created a certain amount of strain in Bhutanese-Indian relations. Subsequently, however, relations improved and continued so till the debacle in NEFA in 1962.

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This raised the fears of the Bhutanese regarding India's capability to defend their country and led to new efforts to increase relations with the United States and other countries.

The northern districts of West Bengal state, which are a part of this discussion, are regularly administered as parts of the state, according to the pattern found elsewhere in India. They participate in the same sort of economic development programs under India's Five Year Plan schedules as do other districts of India proper.

Indian military [redacted] activity. India has since 1950 had a treaty right to station troops in Sikkim. Until recently, it did not utilize this right extensively for fear of antagonizing the local Sikkimese population. Even as lately as 1961, Indian military forces assigned to defend Sikkim were located mainly down on the Indian plains. Since the NEFA debacle, however, the Indian 20th Infantry Division has moved into Sikkim and actively assumed the task of guarding the border. One brigade of this division is in reserve near Gangtok, one is guarding the Nathu La, and one is 8 miles to the southward guarding the Jelep La. The brigade at Gangtok is responsible for forward patrolling into the high hills of northern Sikkim, and a new road has been constructed from Gangtok to Chungtang to assist in this task. New Delhi in 1961 refused a suggestion from the Sikkimese government that a 10,000-man militia of Sikkimese troops be raised to help defend the protectorate, probably doubting the reliability of such a force.

India has no legal right to station troops in Bhutan, and theoretically would have to wait for an invitation to do so. India has, however, suggested on a number of past occasions since 1951 that it be permitted to assist in the defense of Bhutan. These suggestions have been repulsed by the king, who has feared an Indian takeover. The Bhutanese militia, numbering about 3,000, poorly armed and poorly trained, probably would not be effective as a formal fighting force, despite the king's effort to improve its capabilities. A new force, allegedly of 20,000 men mobilized by the king following the 1962 fighting in NEFA, was in early 1963 waiting for Indian arms and training. India assigned 180 NCO's from the Assam Rifles to train this force, but it is not known what progress has been made. Following the Indian defeat in NEFA, Bhutanese respect for Indian military capabilities dwindled, and eagerness for Indian training may have diminished. In early 1963, there were some plans in Bhutan to train 8,000 men for guerrilla warfare.

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Indian forces in Sikkim and West Bengal assigned to the defense of the Sikkim-Bhutan area number at least 45,000 men, and India would probably make a strong defensive stand in this area. In addition to the 20th Division located in Sikkim, the 17th Division is at Hashimari in Cooch Behar district, and the 27th Division is in reserve at Siliguri. An additional Indian brigade is also at Chalsa in Cooch Behar.

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Insofar as domestic security is concerned, India's ability to control local Communist party activities may be fairly good--provided the police have warning of impending trouble. In the spring of 1963, the government of West Bengal reorganized its security organization in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts, establishing 11 checkposts along the Darjeeling-Nepal border.

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There are five posts along the Bhutanese border, where the concentration of men and equipment is greater and control measures even more intensive. The West Bengal police apparently maintain contacts in Sikkim, and special units in Sikkim have arrested suspicious persons there. Movement of foreigners in Sikkim and in the forward areas of West Bengal is banned, except by special permit which is difficult to obtain. Numerous persons of Chinese nationality or origin were arrested and some deported in late 1962 and 1963.

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A relatively low-key pamphlet propaganda output effort is also maintained on the Darjeeling side of the border in an attempt to counter in Tibet the Chinese leaflet propaganda disseminated in India. India is

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also making an effort to improve the effectiveness of its Tibetan language broadcasts. The Indian newspaper Hindustan Times reported on 5 April 1959 that the Chinese were even then jamming these broadcasts.

Chinese political and economic activity. Chinese political and economic initiatives in the Sikkim-Bhutan area have not been as numerous or as far-reaching as in some other parts of the Himalayas. The northern border of Sikkim has not been a subject of significant disagreement since the Chinese reasserted their control over Tibet in 1951. China seems at present to be more interested in wooing Sikkim and Bhutan away from India and into a state of "neutrality" than it is in military conquest. As part of a campaign to treat Sikkim and Bhutan as separate countries, Peiping has refused to discuss their boundaries with Indian officials. Peiping's propaganda, however, has attempted in various ways to emphasize to the Sikkimese and Bhutanese their points of friction with India.

Despite this present attitude, China has in the past indulged in various political maneuvers aimed at undermining Sikkimese and Bhutanese stability and has a number of issues which it could use to justify new political pressures on these states at any time. As part of China's campaign of "cartographic aggression", Chinese maps up to 1961 showed eastern Bhutan as part of Chinese territory. This cartographic claim has not seriously been pressed since that date, but it could be revived to justify taking that part of eastern Bhutan which contains the road leading from Towang, in NEFA just east of the Bhutanese border, through Bhutan to India.

The Chinese also have in Lhasa a potential claimant to the throne of Sikkim, a relative of the present Sikkimese ruling family and grandson of a royal refugee who fled to Tibet to escape from the British. Anti-government and anti-Indian political forces in Sikkim might support future Chinese use of this claimant.

The Chinese radio in Lhasa has been reported to broadcast in Hindi as well as Tibetan and Mandarin. To what extent its Hindi program is heard and understood in Sikkim, Bhutan, and the West Bengal northern districts is unknown. Other Chinese anti-Indian propaganda--of undescribed nature--is said to circulate in Sikkim. Occasionally, Chinese propaganda attempts to create uneasiness among the border people,


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supposedly to break their will to resist any Chinese aggression. The Chinese have also been [REDACTED] behind some of the "Greater Nepal" agitation which suggests uniting eastern Nepal and parts of Sikkim and Bhutan into a separate nation. There apparently have been some Chinese attempts to infiltrate Sikkimese monasteries and subvert Buddhist monks.

Chinese military [REDACTED] activity. The Chumbi valley and the adjacent borders of Sikkim and Bhutan have long been the scene of military alarms and excursions, and India seriously fears a Chinese invasion along this route.

China is currently estimated to have about 25,000 troops opposite eastern Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, including elements of one infantry division, 3 independent infantry regiments, and two border defense regiments. These troops are engaged in various forms of military construction activity, roadbuilding, and patrolling. Each year since 1959 there have been reports of Chinese troops massing in the Chumbi valley, but no serious border-crossing has been attempted in this area as yet.

Soon after the Chinese conquest of Tibet, Chinese military personnel were [REDACTED] in Sikkim supervising the shipment of rice supplies to Tibet. In 1959, at the time of the Tibetan revolt, Chinese patrols kept close watch on the Sikkimese border. There were a number of Chinese border-crossings at this time and some minor clashes. Three Chinese soldiers were arrested in Sikkim in November 1960. In 1961 Chinese patrols also crossed into Sikkim and one soldier was captured. Chinese planes occasionally have violated Sikkimese air space during the last 5 years and have also been [REDACTED] overflying Bhutan.



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[REDACTED] since late 1962. At that time, Chinese troops fighting in NEFA apparently avoided crossing into Bhutanese territory. Presumably, Bhutanese checkposts established along the border with Tibet continue to maintain a guard against Chinese intrusions of any kind. This border was closed by Bhutan in 1959. [REDACTED]

Soviet bloc and indigenous Communist activity. In contrast to the situation in the northern Indian states and Nepal, there appears to be little Soviet bloc interest in Sikkim and Bhutan and a minimal Communist influence inside those two states. A few reports prior to 1962 indicated abortive efforts to organize a Communist movement within Sikkim. Since 1962, Indian military and police presumably have taken measures to eliminate Communist influence throughout this region. [REDACTED]

The most serious threat to local security comes from Communists located in the towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong and athwart the railway line which passes through Siliguri to Assam and NEFA. Prior to 1962, Communist influence was strong in the three districts of Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar. Political campaigning for elections was blatant and intensive, and it included the use of sound trucks, posters, flags, and large political rallies. Kalimpong was widely known as a center of espionage for many nations interested in this part of the Himalayan border. Communist and pro-Communist candidates in the 1957 general elections obtained about 175,000 votes in Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar districts against about 250,000 for the ruling Congress Party. In the 1962 parliamentary elections, after the Chinese threat had become fully evident, candidates of the Communist Party and the pro-Communist Forward Bloc obtained about 200,000 votes in this same area against 293,000 for the Congress Party. While Indian security measures taken since the Chinese attacks of 1962 presumably have lessened

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Communist capabilities, Communist organizational work among tea plantation, transportation, and communications labor unions probably continues, and it would be dangerous to underestimate Communist capabilities for disruption and sabotage in the event of a Chinese attack through the Chumbi valley.

Local reaction to the situation. Attitudes in Sikkim and Bhutan, insofar as they can be estimated, apparently are anti-Chinese at present. On the other hand, they cannot be said to be entirely friendly to India, a point of which India is painfully aware.

Direct information on popular attitudes is non-existent.



Indirect evidence must be used to a great extent in estimating trends of thought in both countries.

The government of Sikkim actually has no choice except to be anti-Chinese at present. Such leaders as the crown prince probably recognize that they would have little future under the Chinese if they should attempt to make common cause with them. Frequent dissatisfaction over Indian behavior in Sikkim probably does not detract from this basic recognition. It is not known whether the common people, with close ties of many kinds to Tibet, are as impressed by this as their leaders.

India probably suffers disproportionately in Sikkim because of its position as a sort of occupying power there.



Despite economic development efforts on the part of India, cessation of trade with Tibet may have caused some hardship to Sikkimese traders whose means of livelihood was taken away. On the other hand, the intensive road-building and development efforts undertaken at Indian inspiration apparently have provided employment for thousands of Sikkimese.

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In Bhutan the situation is somewhat different. Long suspicious of India and bound to Tibet by many ties of blood, language, and religion, Bhutan maintained till 1959 an attitude of independent neutrality. At that time, however, the maharajah of Bhutan apparently made a basic decision that henceforth Bhutan's future had to be linked to India's. He closed Bhutan's border with Tibet and cut off trade with that region. He contracted to open Bhutan's borders from the south by the construction of a series of roads linking all parts of Bhutan to India. He intensified his government's economic development program, and accepted increased Indian assistance in doing so. In May 1963, Bhutan's National Assembly reiterated a desire for continued Indian economic assistance. In late 1962 and 1963, the maharajah also began efforts to increase Bhutan's ties with the outside world, looking to the United States as well as to other countries for recognition and assistance. To some extent, this may have been the result of the discovery that Indian armed forces did not offer the protective capability formerly attributed to them. One past point of conflict between Bhutan and India, the anti-government agitation conducted by the exiled Bhutan State Congress from bases in India, may recently have been removed although there is no evidence to indicate this.



[REDACTED] It may have taken the same sort of action to quiet the Bhutanese State Congress.

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NORTHEAST FRONTIER AGENCY, ASSAM

Summary. The geography of the Northeast Frontier Agency in Assam differs from that in the rest of the Himalayan region in that altitudes are generally lower, passes are less subject to snow blockage in winter, and several low passes leading from Tibet into India are free of snow all winter. Heavy monsoon rains and dense forest on the Indian side of the Himalayan crest, however, hamper both administration and defense of the area.

The peoples of NEFA are among the most picturesque, most isolated and least known of any along the whole Himalayan frontier. Aside from a small number living just east of Bhutan, where Tibetan influence is strong, most NEFA tribesmen are related to the peoples of Burma and Southeast Asia rather than to those of South and West Asia. Slavery and headhunting still recur occasionally, and the use of the bow and arrow is common.

Indian efforts to administer and "civilize" the peoples of NEFA are of recent date. British officials prior to 1947 made little effort to govern any part of NEFA except the foothills, contenting themselves with sending in punitive military expeditions to quiet rambunctious tribes. The government of independent India after 1947 took the view that NEFA tribesmen should enjoy the full benefits of Indian citizenship. Indian administration was pushed up into the hills and economic development programs were begun amongst the tribes, although considerable parts of the Agency had not been effectively reached by the time of the Chinese attacks in 1962. The Indian government stepped up its program of road and airfield construction in and near NEFA after the Chinese conquest of Tibet in 1951, but the Indian army did not seriously move into the hill areas until after the Tibetan revolt of 1959. After this event, a line of Indian checkposts was established along the Tibetan border, moderate-sized military forces were stationed in the hills, and forces in main bases on the plains were strengthened. Following the disastrous defeat by the Chinese in 1962, the Indian army has moved very cautiously in NEFA. Regular army troops remain on the plains, outside NEFA, and lighter Assam Rifle battalions police only areas well removed from the disputed McMahon line boundary.

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Chinese interest in NEFA first became evident in the early 1950's when maps were distributed showing NEFA as part of Chinese territory. Then followed a major Chinese military buildup in Tibet, during which Chinese troop strength and logistic support facilities opposite NEFA were made stronger than in any other part of the Himalayas. The Chinese military expeditions in NEFA and Ladakh in 1962, which followed a propaganda campaign regarding Indian aggressiveness and Chinese counter-attacks, displayed Chinese military superiority and succeeded in their probable objective of causing India to lose face in the eyes of the world. In the spring of 1963, the Chinese repeated their propaganda charges of Indian aggressiveness, conducted some military movements--though on a smaller scale than in 1962--and created a second war scare which again took the Indian government's mind off its Five Year Plan programs. Though Chinese intentions are probably to keep India nervous rather than to acquire more Indian territory at present, the Chinese army could invade NEFA and press to the plains without meeting serious resistance. By the time their forces reached the plains, however, the logistics problems of the Chinese would have mounted rapidly, and it is here that the Indian army apparently intends to hold.

Local tribal reactions within NEFA to Chinese and Indian political and military moves are almost completely unknown, and there is no way of determining what tribal behavior would be in the case of another Chinese attack.

Geographical factors. The Northeast Frontier Agency of Assam is a separate administrative area, constitutionally a part of Assam state but actually administered by the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India, through the Governor of Assam, who is assisted by an Adviser for NEFA. The area consists of five divisions of which four--Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, and Luhit--lie from west to east along the Tibetan border, while one Tirap--is adjacent to Burma. These divisions were established in their present form in 1954 as part of the Indian effort to advance full-scale administration up to the McMahon line.

The NEFA area consists of a belt of steep hill and mountain terrain 50 to 100 miles wide and 31,000 square miles in area. It rises sharply from the Brahmaputra river valley in Assam to the crest of the Great Himalaya range, where peaks reach up to 18,000 or 20,000 foot altitudes. The land is deeply cut by numerous streams, running mainly north to south, whose valleys are choked with heavy vegetation resulting from

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high monsoon rainfall. In some places, generally between hills to the south and high ranges to the north, there are open valleys and rolling hills which permit more extensive tribal settlement and agriculture than elsewhere. In eastern NEFA, these valleys lie at altitudes of only 2,000 to 4,000 feet. The combination of rugged terrain and dense vegetation--with heavy underbrush at lower altitudes--has made NEFA hard to penetrate from the plains and has hindered the development of internal communications. Prior to 1963, the only motorable Indian road reaching deep into the hills was that leading to Towang in Kameng division. Others reached only 30 to 40 miles north of the plains. There are some small airfields suitable for light planes inside NEFA but airdrops are needed to reach forward posts.

The climate of NEFA is dominated by the summer monsoon which deposits 70 to 100 inches of rainfall between June and September and additional rain in pre-monsoon storms beginning in April. Most of NEFA is at such relatively low elevations that cold temperatures and snow are not problems. Only in the high northern passes around 14,000 feet does snow block passes and supply routes for a few days at a time, and these passes probably could be cleared without major difficulty. Lower valley routes, such as those along the upper Subansiri river tributaries and the Nyamjang river, can be used when the high passes are blocked.

On the Tibetan side, Chinese-held territory opposite NEFA is marked by two different sets of features. West of a north-south line drawn from Gyatsa Dzong to Chayul, the landscape consists of high barren plains and mountains and relatively open valleys lying at about 11,000 to 13,000 feet. In the open plains south of Tsethang, spring and winter winds usually prevent any significant accumulations of snow. Close to the border near Towang, temperatures reach zero Fahrenheit, but most winter lows are between 10 and 15 degrees and daily highs around 35 degrees. East of the above line, the Brahmaputra river (known in Tibet as the Tsangpo) and its tributaries have deeply dissected the plateau surface, creating a complex pattern of steep-sided ridges and narrow valleys in which many rivers flow through narrow gorges. In lower elevations to the east, heavier precipitation permits extensive forests, mainly of conifers. The best time of year for military operations on both sides of the border is late summer and autumn.

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The people. The population of NEFA is almost entirely tribal. There are about 30 tribes represented in all, frequently isolated from each other but generally sharing certain common traits. There is no tribal political unity in the area. Among the most important tribes in the region, moving from west to east, are the

- (1) Monpas of Kameng division, adjacent to Bhutan, who number 35,000 to 40,000 persons and are close to the Tibetans in appearance, dress, customs, religion, and trade. The famous Buddhist monastery at Towang, which was until recently administered by Tibet, is in their territory.
- (2) Sherdukpens of Kameng division, numbering 1,200 to 2,000 persons, whose culture is also related to the Tibetan but not so strongly so as that of the Monpas. They reputedly are friendly toward India.
- (3) Mijis and Akas of Kameng division, 5,000 to 10,000 strong, who have mixed characteristics. The Akas are keen traders who do business in Bhutan. These tribes are closer to Indian influence than some farther north.
- (4) Daflas of eastern Kameng and western Subansiri divisions, numbering 80,000 to 150,000, who are noted for their warlike, turbulent behavior and who caused the British a lot of trouble. They are widely distributed in NEFA and have contacts with many other tribes.
- (5) Apa Tanis of Subansiri division, 9,000 persons, living in 7 large villages, who are highly organized, industrious, have stable agriculture, and are the most advanced of the NEFA tribes.
- (6) Tagins of northeastern Subansiri and western Siang divisions, numbering 9,000, a primitive tribe, not very well known, hostile to outsiders, aggressive, and warlike.
- (7) Hill Miris in Subansiri division, totalling 4,000 people. They are not a fighting group like the Daflas or Tagins, but have close contacts with the Assamese of the plains and have intermarried with them. They trade with the Daflas and Apa Tanis. They are one of the more approachable tribal groups.

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(8) Adis (once called Abors) of Siang division, numbering 67,000, who are a conglomeration of about 20 minor tribes. They have an old reputation for troublemaking and slave-keeping, but they now are cooperative and becoming pacified.

(9) Mishmis of Luhit division, of 45,000 persons broken into three subdivisions. They live mainly in small family groups rather than villages. Formerly warlike, they are now peaceable. They live in the ruggedest territory in NEFA, but they are keen traders. They used to have considerable trade with Tibet, which is now presumably stopped.

(10) Singpos, Tangasa, Wanchos, and Noctes of Luhit and Tirap divisions, whose territory faces Burma and who are not important to the present discussion.

The basic unit of social organization among these tribes is the patrilineal family. Polygamy is a common form of marriage, though some polyandry is found among tribes close to Tibet. Family units of 20 to 30 persons frequently live in one large house. There are social classes but no caste system. Many groups own slaves, but this is discouraged by the government of India. Tribes are divided into exogamous clans but intertribal marriage is not common. Clans are important socially but not politically.

Except for a few very primitive hunters and food-gatherers, most tribesmen live in villages of varying size and practice agriculture. Villages generally are governed by a local council. Only the tribes along the Burma border have chiefs who control several villages, although a few tribes have aristocratic families who rule with the aid of a village council. The Indian government is trying to establish its panchayat (or village council) system of local government in the tribal areas.

Languages are Tibeto-Burman and number about 50 dialects. There are four major groupings including Tibetan dialects of the Monpas and tribes of the north; dialects of the Miris, Adis, Daflas and some others; the language of the Singpo, which is related to Thai; and the languages of the tribes along the Burma border which are related to the Nagas farther south in Assam. The lingua franca is Assamese, which is spoken mainly in the plains of the Brahmaputra river valley.

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Religions in NEFA are mainly animistic, involving beliefs in a benevolent supreme being and the propitiation of numerous spirits. There are a few exceptions, as among the Monpas in Kameng division who are Tibetan-type Buddhists. The Singpos in Luhit division practise a modified form of Buddhism. The Noctes along the Burma border are Hindus.

The economy is mainly a shifting form of agriculture, wherein fields are cleared, cultivated for a few years, and then abandoned for new fields when underbrush grows thick enough to hamper cultivation. The population in NEFA does not shift from one locality to another as it does in Southeast Asia, however. There is permanent agriculture only among the Monpas, Sherdukpens, and Apa Tanis. Rice, millets, and maize are staple crops, and many fruits and vegetables are also grown. Domestic animals include cattle, pigs, goats, and chickens. There is considerable hunting and fishing. Weaving of textiles and bamboo and cane work are common. There is very little metalworking. There is much trade of a local variety, there being many basic lacks in the village economies. Most of the trading takes place in winter and is mainly with Assam. Trade with Tibet has traditionally been less, although some salt, wool, and Buddhist religious items have been imported. The Indian government has been airdropping salt to tribesmen since the early 1950's. Tibetan trade presumably has been cut off since 1959, except for minor exchanges.

Indian political and economic activity. Until recently, NEFA has been isolated from the mainstream of development in Assam and the rest of India, having been officially closed to outsiders since 1873. Under the British, only a few explorers ventured into the high hills. Warlike tribes feuded and raided with each other and reacted violently to outside interference. After the Japanese threat to Assam developed in World War-II, the British began to expand their administration up above the foothills.

The government of independent India after 1947 felt more sense of responsibility to the tribesmen and attempted to bring them into the greater Indian family. Partly this effort was due to a sense of national responsibility. Partly it was to ensure the safety of the Tibetan border against Chinese influence. While Indian activities in NEFA have never been reported in detail, the broad outlines of the Indian program are evident.

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Each of the divisions of NEFA is under the control of a Political Officer, who is assisted by representatives of the technical departments of government such as agriculture, health, education, and industry. Subdivisions are in charge of Assistant Political Officers, who have Base and Area Superintendents under them. The Indian aim in NEFA is to achieve all-round development of the tribal people. There is some conflict between political groups in Assam and the Indian government in New Delhi as to whether the NEFA tribesmen should become completely integrated with other Indians or whether they should retain most elements of their tribal culture. The government is committed to "separateness." Something in between will probably result.

Under India's Second Five Year Plan (1956-61), \$19,000,000 was planned for economic development projects including roads, airstrips, power projects, agriculture, medical and health facilities, education, community development, forests, and small industry. By far the biggest appropriations were for roads. (During the decade 1951-1961, 780 miles of roads, 654 miles of mule trails, and 3,300 miles of porter trails reportedly were built in NEFA.) In addition, the government introduced improved seeds, held farming method demonstrations, introduced sugar-making and sericulture, taught trades to craftsmen, and built schools (there were two primary schools in 1947, and 159 primary schools, 20 intermediate schools, and 6 high schools in 1963). The government has also set up a network of airfields for light planes and DC-3s, established a wireless network for rapid communications, and has gradually increased the telephone network in NEFA. This work was not always easy as the tribesmen sometimes caused trouble and the Assam Rifles had to pacify them.

Most of this program presumably was disrupted by the Chinese attacks in 1962, and no information is available as to how much of it has been resumed. Following the Chinese withdrawal in November 1962, the Indians waited some time before sending even civil administrators back to all parts of NEFA. Bomdila was reoccupied by civil forces on 10 December 1962, and on 22 January civil administration was back in Towang. By February, news reports indicated civilian officials were back in all parts of NEFA, but there is no information (except at Bum La in Kameng division) as to how close to the border they are located and how actively they are pushing their development programs. NEFA has been kept closed to outsiders, partly to avoid a great influx of Indians, partly to prevent exploitation of the tribesmen,

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and partly--according to Nehru--to prevent espionage. The task of redevelopment was complicated in the spring of 1963 by serious floods, rice shortages, and rising prices in Assam. In June 1963, the Indian Planning Commission approved expenditures in NEFA of \$3,900,000 during fiscal 1963/64.

Nothing is known regarding a possible educational and propaganda campaign being waged by the Indian government to convince NEFA tribesmen that India remains a powerful country and that it has their best interests at heart. It is doubtful that India has an effective propaganda program reaching across the Tibetan border in this area. The Indian government has taken considerable pains to indicate to the Chinese that it has not sent troops back into NEFA.

Indian military and intelligence activity. The Indian military position which existed in NEFA prior to October 1962 was wiped out during the Chinese attacks, and the present situation is rather different.

Instead of a series of small outposts directly on the Tibetan frontier, backed up by units of intermediate size about 20 miles below the McMahon line and larger units on the Brahmaputra plain, the Indian regular army now is confined to the plains area. Totaling at least 45,000 men under the 4th Corps headquarters at Tezpur, the 5th Division is near Tezpur, the 23rd Division near Gauhati, and the 2nd Division at the head of the Brahmaputra valley below eastern NEFA. In addition, there are in NEFA five battalions of Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force used for police purposes. The army apparently has no intention of moving back up to positions in the hills--it is using the Assam Rifles as a forward screen--and it expects to counter any new Chinese attack in force only when that attack reaches the low foot-hills.


In April 1963 units of the Assam Rifles were sent to within 20 kilometers of the McMahon line to support civil administrators in maintaining order. At present, they are believed to be scattered widely throughout NEFA in small unit positions.

There is very little reporting on Indian security measures [REDACTED] During the fighting in 1962, Indian officials [REDACTED] moved Soviet technicians working on economic development projects in Assam to other tasks in Gujarat in western India.

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On 1 April 1963, Defense Minister Chavan told parliament that the army was going to make a thorough investigation of its reverses in NEFA to determine what went wrong and "to derive military lessons." What improvements have been made are undisclosed. On 5 August 1963, the NEFA Adviser to the Governor of Assam publicly indicated knowledge of Chinese patrols penetrating into NEFA in May and of Chinese planes over-flying NEFA on one or two occasions. He also indicated that a number of suspected Chinese agents, including Tibetans, had been taken into custody.



Chinese political and economic activity. The Sino-Indian dispute over the validity of the McMahon Line is well known. India claims that it forms the boundary between NEFA and Tibet, while the validity of the line is challenged by Peiping. The history of the Chinese punitive "counterattack" made last October is also well documented. Little is known, however, of specific Chinese political and economic measures now being taken either on the Tibetan or the Indian side of the McMahon line. Aside from a number of supposedly civilian checkposts set up along the NEFA border to assure that the integrity of the demilitarized zone is not violated, Chinese activity seems to be confined mainly to propaganda.

Internationally disseminated propaganda includes material regarding the return of captured Indian weapons, the return of Indian prisoners of war, the kind treatment given the border peoples during the Chinese occupation of NEFA, the good relations existing between them, and the sorrow of both Indian prisoners and NEFA tribesmen at their leave-taking with the Chinese. The Chinese in a number of propaganda

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
films have made good use of these themes, especially emphasizing the racial similarities between Chinese troops and NEFA tribesmen. The Chinese have also been reported as trying to drive a wedge between Indian and Gurkha prisoners, telling the Nepalese Gurkhas that they were untrue to their country, which has good relations with China. Chinese propaganda has effectively rubbed in the fact of Chinese military superiority over the Indians.

On the Chinese side of the border, the Chinese apparently have indicated to local peoples their ability and intention to return to NEFA and to penetrate to the edge of the plains of Assam. Tibetans have been told to keep pack animals ready for use if necessary. Chinese territorial claims have been reaffirmed, there has been some talk of "liberating" NEFA tribesmen, and some requests for their assistance have been made. Rumors of a Chinese return have also circulated inside NEFA during the spring of 1963. Much of this propaganda seems to have been psychological warfare, accompanying reports of a big Chinese buildup in Tibet. Some effort to attract NEFA tribals is indicated by the [redacted] establishment of shops on the Tibetan side of the border selling essential articles at cheap rates.

Chinese military [redacted] activity. Chinese armed forces are present in greater numbers north of NEFA than in any other part of the immediate Himalayan frontier area. There are estimated to be about 44,000 Chinese army troops in this area, including elements of one and possibly two divisions, 7 independent regiments, and 3 border defense regiments. Following the Chinese withdrawal behind the McMahon line last November, the border remained quiet. By April 1963, however, the Chinese were [redacted] patrolling in forward areas again, and rumors of a big military buildup began to reach India. These rumors apparently were exploited by the Indian government for various political purposes, and facts regarding the buildup became difficult to separate from politically inspired fiction. Indian military officers consistently discounted the rumors. By August these rumors were still unconfirmed, despite more aggressive patrolling by Indian troops who had been ordered to investigate them. The Chinese army has the capability of jumping off at any time with little further warning or buildup, however.

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Soviet bloc and Indian Communist activity. The Soviet bloc apparently does not have as great an interest in, nor as ready access to, the NEFA border as it does farther west in India. There is no Soviet bloc activity in NEFA. There are some Soviet, Rumanian, and Czech economic aid projects in the plains of Assam, however. Soviet bloc [redacted] subversion capabilities in NEFA are believed minimal.

Politically, the Indian Communist Party in Assam is not strong, and it is probably weaker than it was in 1962 as a result of Indian security measures. No Communist movement or Indian Communist activity is known to exist in NEFA. In the spring of 1963, however, Assamese Communists were attempting to create dissatisfaction over floods, rice shortages, and high prices.

The most serious danger to be expected from Assamese Communists appears to be their capability to disrupt lines of communication to the fighting forces in NEFA in the event of a future Chinese attack. The Communist Party, which dominates the labor unions in the Indian government Posts and Telegraphs Department, conducted an embarrassing slowdown in the telegraph system throughout India in the spring of 1962. Members of these same unions probably were responsible for the [redacted] sabotage of nearly all Post and Telegraph open wirelines in Assam and between Assam and New Delhi during the fighting in NEFA later in 1962. This was long after the Chinese threat had become apparent and after Indian security measures had been drastically tightened. Even in 1963, Communist sabotage capabilities were further suggested by a bomb explosion on 15 March on the railway track near Tezpur, Assam, the Indian army's main base at the foot of the route leading up to Towang, Bum La, and Khinzemane, just east of Bhutan.

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Local reaction to the situation. Not enough is known about local attitudes in NEFA either before or after the Chinese attacks last October to make a valid estimate of tribal loyalties or dissidence in that area. Early in 1962


[REDACTED] some tribals having cultural affinities with Tibet felt it was prudent to cultivate Assamese Communists because of the possibility that the Chinese might some day enter Assam and "liberate" them. Following the October attacks, both India and China made such propaganda capital out of the reception received from the tribals by invading Chinese troops and returning Indian administrators that the truth is not determinable. There have been some hints, however, that the returning Indians have not found the situation to their liking.

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Indian administrators have found evidence of tribal looting and some evidence of collaboration with the Chinese. Furthermore, the tribals are said to view with some bitterness the quick evacuation of NEFA by Indian officials last fall. The most widely publicized incident was one on 31 May 1963 when a group of Daflas, armed with modern Chinese automatic weapons killed a dozen persons, including some Indian officials who apparently had been attempting to disarm them and restore civil control in their tribal area. [REDACTED] the guns had been left behind by the Chinese rather than intentionally supplied to the Daflas, [REDACTED]. The Daflas have a well-earned reputation for unruliness and would be prime targets for Chinese subversive effort.

On the positive side of the ledger is an Indian newspaper report of 24 May 1963 which says Indian army recruiting efforts, attempted for the first time among NEFA tribesmen, had met with "encouraging" results.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR AREA
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS


BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE



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JAMMU AND KASHMIR

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